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While several studies have shown that support receipt in self-relevant domains may bring 
about increases in distress by delivering inefficacy cues to the recipient (e.g., Bolger & 
Amarel, 2007; Burke & Goren, under revision), results also indicate that some 
individuals are still able to experience benefits of support receipt in self-relevant domains 
(Burke & Perndorfer, in prep.). The purpose of the present research was to examine 
whether self-complexity, which has been shown to moderate the relationship between 
stress and health and well-being, moderates reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant 
domains. Study 1 (N = 77) attempted to expand past research on self-complexity by 
introducing measures of the purported cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity 
results in affective consequences. Study 2 (N = 77) examined whether self-complexity 
moderates reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant domains.  The results of the 
analyses did not support the hypothesis that participants low or high in self-complexity 
react differently to either failure feedback or support receipt in self-relevant domains. 
While the studies were unable to replicate past studies of self-complexity or provide 
support for self-complexity moderating reactivity to support receipt, we believe that the 
novel measures and modified procedures described in this research are contributions to 
both the self-complexity and social support literature.   
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Self-complexity: A potential moderator of reactivity to social support receipt 
Distress caused by both major life events (e.g., divorce, death of a spouse, job 
loss) and the accumulation of recent minor stressors is associated with both physical and 
mental health problems (see Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1978; Kanner, Coyne, Shaefer, 
& Lazarus, 1980; Silver & Wortman, 1980; Thoits, 1983). While the relationship 
between stressful life events and physical and mental health problems is consistently 
observed, it is often only low to moderate, suggesting the existence of moderating 
variables that account for individual differences in vulnerability to stressful life events 
(Linville, 1980, 1987). Social support is perhaps the most widely studied process for 
reducing the impact of stress. While social support has been shown to moderate the 
relationship between stress and health and well-being, social support alone does not 
account for all of the variability in the link between stress and health outcomes, 
suggesting that other variables also moderate this relationship. Furthermore, studies of 
social support receipt have reported mixed outcomes, with support receipt sometimes 
leading to reduced distress (e.g., Abraído-Lanza, 2004), and sometimes leading to 
increased distress (e.g., Shrout, Herman, & Bolger, 2006).  
Recent research suggests that the recipient’s cognitive evaluations of the support 
behavior influence its impact (e.g., Bolger and Amarel, 2007; Bolger, Zuckerman, & 
Kessler, 2000), and that costs of support receipt are more likely to be seen in personally 
important domains (Burke & Goren, under revision; Burke and Perndorfer, in prep.). 
Burke and Perndorfer examined reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant as compared 
to less salient domains and found that participants experienced more distress following 
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support receipt in a self-relevant domain as compared to a domain for which efficacy and 
autonomy were less important. However, participants in the study by Burke and 
Perndorfer varied substantially in their reactivity to support receipt in the self-relevant 
domain, with some experiencing strong benefits of support receipt while others 
experienced strong costs. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate one possibility for 
why individuals may vary in the impact of support receipt in a personally relevant 
domain. More specifically, we propose that self-complexity, another moderator of the 
relationship between stress and health and well-being (Linville, 1980, 1987), may 
account for this variability. 
Social support  
Four decades of research has linked social support to personal and relational 
outcomes, including mental and physical health (Barerra, 1986; Cohen & Wills, 1985; 
Cobb, 1976; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Uchino, 2009). Much of the research 
linking social support to personal and relational outcomes has defined social support as 
the perception that one is loved and cared for by others, esteemed and valued, and part of 
a social network of mutual assistance and obligations (Cobb, 1976; Wills 1991). This 
definition conceptualizes perceived support or one’s belief about the availability of 
supportive others in times of need. Research indicates that perceived support availability 
is not strongly related to amount of support received during times of stress (Haber, 
Cohen, Lucas, & Baltes, 2007). Instead, research suggests that perceived support is more 
closely related to global traits (e.g., self-esteem, control beliefs, attachment security) 
(Lakey & Drew, 1996; Uchino, 2009). Uchino (2009) describes this set of characteristics 
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as a positive psychosocial profile that co-develops in the context of positive, early 
familial relationships. Furthermore, while perceived support is almost unequivocally 
associated with positive outcomes, studies of enacted support receipt, or the actual 
support individuals receive during times of stress, have reported positive, negative, and 
null associations with health and well-being (Gleason, Iida, Shrout, & Bolger, 2008; 
Miller, Smerglia, Gaudet, & Kitson, 1998; Revenson, Wollman, & Felton, 1983). Taken 
together this research suggests that perceived and enacted support are different 
constructs, with divergent influences on the stress-support-depression process. 
Understanding costs of support  
As previously stated, while perceived support has been almost unequivocally 
associated with positive outcomes, studies of enacted support have reported more mixed 
outcomes, with support receipt sometimes leading to reduced distress (e.g., Abraído-
Lanza, 2004), and sometimes leading to increased distress (e.g., Shrout, Herman, & 
Bolger, 2006). Given the complexity and variety of supportive interactions, it is unlikely 
that a single mechanism will account for the mixed consequences that follow from 
support receipt. Several potential explanations for the mixed outcomes following support 
receipt have been proposed in the literature. Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the 
mixed outcomes following support belief is the poor execution of the supportive behavior 
by the provider. Poor execution of support delivery can occur when efforts to help 
backfire and result in interpersonal conflict between the support provider and recipient, 
when support delivery creates feelings of indebtedness and/or inequity in the recipient 
following support receipt, when there is a mismatch between the support behavior and the 
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recipient’s needs, or when there is emotional overinvolvement by the provider (Bolger & 
Amarel, 2007; Coyne, Wortman, & Lehman, 1988; Cutrona & Russel, 1990; Fisher, 
Nadler, & Whitcher-Alagna, 1982; Gleason et al., 2003; Seidman, Shrout, & Bolger, 
2006). The mixed consequences that follow from support receipt, however, are not solely 
explained by the skill with which the provider executes support delivery. Evidence 
suggests that the support recipient also influences the consequences that follow from 
support behaviors. 
In particular, recent research suggests that the recipient’s interpretation of the 
supportive behavior also contributes to the consequences of support receipt (Bolger & 
Amarel, 2007; Christenfeld et al., 1997; Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 1999). For 
example, research on invisible support indicates that the same supportive behavior, 
delivery of helpful information, can increase or decrease distress depending on whether 
the same information is delivered as advice or as an offhand comment (Bolger & Amarel, 
2007). Research by Christenfeld and colleagues (1997) and Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin 
(1999) indicates that the consequences of support receipt on mood and physiological 
arousal can depend on who delivers the supportive behavior – for instance, a friend vs. 
research confederate or a male vs. female research confederate. Because the support and 
stressors in these cases were the same, the differing consequences following support 
receipt were likely a result of how these contextual factors affected psychological 
experiences of the interaction. 
The Experiences in Supportive Interactions (ESI) Model (Burke, Ignarri, & 
Goren; under revision) draws on general principles of social cognition to describe how 
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the support recipient’s active mental representations about the self and others can 
influence the cognitive appraisal of support receipt, thereby affecting personal and 
relational outcomes. Mental representations, or general knowledge structures developed 
over a lifetime of experience, act as a lens through which information is appraised and 
future expectancies are created. Because mental representations are created through a 
lifetime of experiences, they will vary from person to person. Furthermore, mental 
representations differ in their level of activation, depending on situational cues. The ESI 
model posits that support receipt triggers two meditational pathways that, in turn, 
influence the well-being of the support recipient: the tangible pathway and the cognitive 
pathway. The tangible pathway of the ESI Model refers to the tangible outcomes of the 
support behavior such as the degree to which the supportive behavior reduces the degree 
of threat brought on by the stressor. The tangible pathway of the ESI Model likely 
represents the primary purpose of the delivery of support by the provider and will result 
in a reduction in distress to the extent that the support behavior reduces the 
threat/challenge brought on by the stressor. This effect is present regardless of the 
recipient’s psychological state or active mental representations.  
The cognitive pathway of the ESI Model attempts to explain the conditions under 
which negative consequences may follow from support receipt. Supportive behaviors are 
ambiguous events that have the potential to convey mixed messages: that one is loved 
and cared for by others or that one’s own efforts and abilities were insufficient (Burke, 
Ignarri, & Goren; under revision). The cognitive pathway of the ESI Model refers to the 
recipient’s appraisal of the supportive behavior – that is, the appraisal and meaning 
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derived from the support behavior. The cognitive appraisal of the support behavior 
should be generally positive in relation to both the provider and the relationship – that 
one is loved and cared for. However, support may reflect negatively on the self, 
suggesting that one’s own efforts and abilities were insufficient. 
According to the model, stress contexts that occur in domains irrelevant to one’s 
sense of self are likely to lead to a positive appraisal of support receipt by the target 
individual such that the target views the provider’s intentions as being supportive, loving, 
and caring. However, when the stress occurs in a domain that threatens a core aspect of 
the working self-concept, support receipt may deliver the sense that one’s own abilities 
and efforts were insufficient, thereby increasing distress through this lowered self-
evaluation. Therefore, according to this model, support receipt in domains for which 
efficacy and autonomy are important will be associated with costs through the delivery of 
inefficacy cues whereas the costs of support receipt should be minimal in domains for 
which efficacy and autonomy are unimportant.  
Several existing studies support the premise of the ESI Model. Bolger and Amarel 
(2000, 2007) ran several studies in which they manipulated the visibility of support – that 
is, they examined the costs of visible support as compared to invisible support, or 
instances of support provision (as reported by the provider) that go unnoticed by the 
recipient. The authors found that visible support to a self-relevant stress context was 
associated with emotional costs not associated with invisible support (Bolger & Amarel, 
2000). Furthermore, the authors found that visible support was associated with increased 
emotional reactivity to a self-relevant stress context because it communicated a sense of 
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inefficacy to the participant (Bolger & Amarel, 2007). In two studies, Burke and Goren 
(under revision) investigated whether support imparted more costs when in a self-relevant 
domain and whether the consequences of support receipt can be explained by changes in 
self-evaluation. Using a daily diary study, the authors found that costs of support receipt 
became more prominent as a self-relevant stressor approached in time and that support 
receipt was more strongly linked to distress on days for which participants reported the 
most stressful aspect of the day as being related to the looming self-relevant stressor. In a 
second study, they manipulated the framing of a stressful task and the presence of support 
and found that participants experienced greater increases in distress following support 
receipt in a task framed as being self-relevant than did participants in the irrelevant task 
framing condition. The costs of support receipt in the self-relevant context were partially 
mediated by the strengthened link between support receipt and self-evaluation in the self-
relevant context. This research supports the ESI Model in that support receipt in self-
relevant domains was associated with greater increases in distress than was support 
receipt in irrelevant contexts and that this effect was in part explained by self-evaluation. 
The studies just reviewed have primarily examined the consequences of support 
receipt in achievement domains. Most recently however, Burke and Perndorfer (in prep.) 
sought to examine the consequences following from support receipt in a more relational 
stress context: pregnancy. Past research shows that stress during pregnancy increases the 
risk for postpartum depression (O’Hara, 1989; O’Hara & Swain, 1996; Robertson et al., 
2004; Yim et al., 2009). To the extent that pregnancy and motherhood are self-relevant 
domains for women, the ESI suggests that receiving support in these domains should 
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increase distress. If so, negative reactivity to support receipt may also be linked to risk for 
postpartum depression. We examined the consequences following from support receipt in 
motherhood-related as compared to motherhood-unrelated domains for a sample of 
pregnant women and how these consequences were related to depression symptoms at 
postpartum with a longitudinal diary study spanning from the sixth month of pregnancy 
to six weeks postpartum. We predicted that to the extent that motherhood is a domain for 
which efficacy and autonomy are important for pregnant women, receipt of motherhood-
related support may entail costs not observed for less salient domains during this time. 
We found that receipt of motherhood-related support led to a greater increase in distress 
than did receipt of motherhood-unrelated support. Thus, the daily consequences of 
support receipt during pregnancy did depend on whether the support was motherhood-
related or not. The analyses also revealed that women varied substantially in their 
reactivity to motherhood-related support receipt, such that some women experienced 
costs associated with motherhood-related support, while others experienced benefits. 
Furthermore, how strongly a given woman reacted to receiving motherhood-related 
support significantly predicted her phase three depression scores. Women who reacted 
more negatively to motherhood-related support receipt had, on average, higher depression 
scores at postpartum than did women who reacted less negatively to the same support, 
even adjusting for baseline depressive symptoms.  
That women significantly varied in their reactivity to support receipt in a self-
relevant domain and that this reactivity was significantly predictive of an important long-
term outcome begs the question of what gives rise to this variability in reactivity to 
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support receipt in self-relevant domains? Burke and Perndorfer (in prep.) did examine 
possible moderators of the variability in reactivity to support receipt in the self-relevant 
domain (e.g., self-esteem, intensive mothering beliefs), but none of the measured 
variables were able to explain the observed variability in reactions to this support. That 
none of the measured variables were able to explain this variability may have been due to 
the relatively low power of the study (we had only about 30 participants), or to the 
relatively low level of variability in several of these moderators. With a larger and more 
representative sample some of the measured variables may have more strongly predicted 
reactions to support receipt. However, the fact remains that something was giving rise to 
variability in reactions to support in this study and that this variability was related to 
postpartum depressive symptoms, prompting us to explore other possibilities. 
Self-complexity 
Another possible reason for the variability observed by Burke and Perndorfer (in 
prep.) is that women varied in how self-defining the motherhood domain was for them. 
While all women rated motherhood as being important to them, motherhood may have 
been more central in the self-representations of some women as compared to those of 
others, and, consequently, the cognitive evaluation and consequences of that support may 
also have varied. People possess a great amount of information about themselves as 
compared to other cognitive domains (Linville, 1980). The self is cognitively represented 
as a complex structure that develops to help organize and process this great amount of 
self-relevant information (Linville, 1980). Part of this complex structure involves 
representing the self in terms of multiple aspects (see Gergen, 1971; Gordon, 1968; 
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James, 1892; Sullivan, 1953). For example, information about the self might be organized 
in terms of social roles (lawyer, tennis player, friend, mother), traits (extravert), physical 
features (slim), category membership (male, black), behavior (jogger), abilities 
(analytical), preferences (vegetarian), goals (professional success), autobiographical 
recollections (summers at the lake), and relations with others (loyal friend, nurturer, 
colleague), all representing multiple aspects of the self (Linville, 1980). Linville (1980) 
proposed that the self is cognitively represented in terms of such aspects, that self-aspects 
differ in the affect associated with them, that people differ in the degree of complexity of 
their self-representation, and that overall affect and self-appraisal are a function of the 
affect and self-appraisal associated with different aspects of the self.  
Self-complexity refers to the degree of complexity of an individual’s self-
representation, which is a function of two factors: the number of aspects one uses to 
cognitively organize information about the self and the degree of relatedness among these 
aspects (Linville, 1980). Individuals’ representations of the self will vary in terms of the 
number of self-aspects they use to organize their self-relevant knowledge, which is likely 
related to the number of actual roles he or she has in his/her life (Linville, 1980). The 
degree of relatedness of individuals’ self-aspects refers to the degree that ups and downs 
of feelings about one aspect influence the ups and downs of feelings about another aspect 
(Linville, 1980). In other words, the relatedness of aspects refers to the degree to which 
an experience that activates one aspect also activates other aspects. The assumption made 
by Linville (1980) is that the impact of an experience related to one aspect spreads to 
other aspects depending on the strength of their relatedness. Both the degree to which 
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actual events in the real world regarding different self-aspects are correlated and the 
perceived relatedness of self-aspects contribute to the degree of relatedness among 
aspects in the self-representation (Linville, 1980). Greater self-complexity will result 
from a large number of self-aspects that are independent of one another (in terms of both 
actual and perceived covariation) whereas lower self-complexity will result from a small 
number of self-aspects that are highly interdependent. Finally, Linville (1980) proposed 
that overall affect and self-appraisal are a weighted average of the affect and self-
appraisal associated with one’s individual aspects. Important or salient self-aspects 
receive more weight in this averaging process (Linville, 1980).  
Linville (1980) proposed the self-complexity and affective extremity hypothesis, 
which posits that those lower in self-complexity will experience greater swings in affect 
and self-appraisal as compared to those higher in self-complexity. The rationale behind 
this hypothesis is best explained by considering the extreme case in which self-
complexity involves a large number of aspects that are highly independent of one 
another. When self-complexity is comprised of a large number of aspects, an event that 
has an impact on a single aspect is less likely to influence overall affect and self-appraisal 
because this single aspect is a very small proportion of the total number of self-aspects 
that make up the cognitive representation of the self. Similarly, when self-complexity is 
comprised of aspects that are independent of one another, an event that has an impact on 
a single aspect is less likely to influence overall affect and self-appraisal because the 
impact of that event will have less “spill-over” from one aspect to others.  
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In support of the self-complexity and affective extremity hypothesis, Linville 
(1980) found that those lower in self-complexity experienced greater swings in affect and 
self-appraisal following a failure or success experience. Similarly, results from a 2-week 
diary study in which participants completed an affect scale each day indicated that those 
lower in self-complexity experienced greater variability in affect during this 2-week 
period than did those higher in self-complexity (Linville, 1980). The results of these 
studies suggest that self-complexity buffers against the negative effects of stressful life 
events.  
In 1987, Linville advanced research on self-complexity by examining the self-
complexity buffering hypothesis – that is, greater self-complexity moderates the adverse 
impact of stress on depression and illness. In this way, Linville (1980, 1987) proposed 
that self-complexity is another possible moderator of the relationship between stress and 
physical and mental health. Results from the study support the buffering hypothesis – 
participants higher in self-complexity were less prone to depression, perceived stress, 
physical symptoms, and the occurrence of the flu and other illnesses following high 
levels of stressful events than were participants lower in self-complexity. 
Much of the research on self-complexity has examined the individual difference 
factor’s relationship with stress and coping (Dixon & Baumeister, 1991; Linville, 1980, 
1987; Luo & Watkins, 2008). Results of self-complexity studies like those conducted by 
Linville (1980, 1987) are discussed in terms of self-complexity as a buffer against the 
negative effects of stress and as a moderator of the relationship between stressful life 
events and physical and mental health. Just as some individuals are more susceptible to 
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the adverse consequences of stress, the results of Burke and Perndorfer (in prep.) suggest 
that some individuals are also more susceptible to the adverse consequences of support 
receipt in self-relevant domains. The purpose of this thesis was to test whether self-
complexity explains variability in reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant domains, 
such as that observed by Burke and Perndorfer (in prep.). 
Self-complexity and the consequences of support receipt 
 According to the ESI Model, support receipt in self-relevant domains is 
associated with costs by delivering the sense that one’s own efforts and abilities were 
insufficient, thereby increasing distress through this lowered self-evaluation. In this 
sense, support receipt in self-relevant domains can be considered much like failure 
feedback in that it delivers inefficacy cues to the recipient. In the study by Linville 
(1980), following failure feedback, individuals lower in self-complexity experienced 
lower affect and more negative self-evaluation than those higher in self-complexity. 
Following from this research, to the extent that support receipt communicates failure or 
insufficient effort or ability in a self-relevant domain, individuals low in self-complexity 
should react more negatively than individuals high in self-complexity to such support. If 
so, self-complexity might explain at least some of the variability in responses to support 
receipt observed by Burke and Perndorfer (in prep.). While support receipt in a self-
relevant domain (pregnancy and motherhood for a sample of pregnant women) was, on 
average, associated with a greater increase in distress than was support receipt in less 
salient domains (motherhood-unrelated support receipt), women significantly varied in 
their reactivity to support receipt in the self-relevant domain. Thus, although support 
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receipt in a motherhood-related domain may have delivered the sense that one’s own 
efforts and abilities were insufficient to all women, high self-complexity may have 
buffered against the negative effects of this support receipt for some women. Women low 
in self-complexity, however, likely experienced greater costs following from support 
receipt in a motherhood-related domain because the aspect of pregnancy/motherhood 
makes up a larger proportion of their overall self and is more related to other self-aspects 
of the self-representation. 
In sum, we hypothesized that self-complexity, as defined by Linville (1980), 
would account for some of the variability in reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant 
domains, which in turn is predictive of long-term outcomes. In line with this hypothesis, 
individuals low in self-complexity should react more negatively to support receipt in self-
relevant domains for the same reason they experience lower affect and more negative 
self-evaluations following failure feedback: a greater proportion of the overall self will be 
colored by the negative appraisal of support receipt due to both a lower number of 
aspects and/or greater “spill-over” from one aspect to others. While support receipt in 
self-relevant domains may still deliver inefficacy cues to individuals with high self-
complexity, the domain in which the stress and support occur comprise a smaller 
proportion of their overall self and will be less related to other aspects than in individuals 
lower in self-complexity. Thus, the greater number of aspects possessed by individuals 
high in self-complexity and/or their independence acts as a buffer against the negative 
effects of support receipt in self-relevant domains on distress. 
Mechanisms of self-complexity 
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 In spite of the evidence that self-complexity buffers the impact of stress and the 
theoretical propositions given for why it does so, the literature provides little evidence for 
the actual mechanisms by which self-complexity operates. Why might self-complexity, 
defined in terms of the number and degree of relatedness of self-aspects, result in 
affective consequences? One assumption of Linville’s self-complexity affective extremity 
hypothesis (1980) is that overall affect and self-appraisal are a function of the affect and 
self-appraisal associated with different aspects of the self. Consider the case involving a 
large number of completely independent self-aspects and an event (such as failure 
feedback or support receipt in a self-relevant domain) that has an impact on a single 
relevant aspect. Since aspects are completely independent of one another, the impact of 
the event is limited to the affect and self-appraisal associated with this one aspect and 
therefore has less of an impact on overall affect and self-appraisal. Because this aspect is 
a very small proportion of the total number of identities that make up the self-
representation, the total impact of the event on overall affect and self-appraisal is likely to 
be relatively small.  
 Linville (1980) argues that the perceived relatedness of different aspects, or the 
degree to which an experience that activates one aspect of the self also activates other 
aspects, will predict the degree of “spill-over” between different aspects. Roughly 
defined “spill-over” is the extent to which pleasant or unpleasant feelings about one part 
of the self result in pleasant or unpleasant feelings about other parts of the self-
representation. The actual cognitive mechanism of this “spill-over,” however, remains 
both undefined and unmeasured in the self-complexity literature. Linville (1980) suggests 
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that it might involve a spreading activation process through a network involving self-
aspects as semantic nodes and their associated affect nodes (Bower, 1981; Clark & Isen, 
1982; as reported by Linville, 1980). A second goal of current study was to examine this 
spill-over process and other cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may result 
in affective consequences. 
First considering the spill-over process, Linville’s (1980) self-complexity and 
affective extremity hypothesis suggests that threatened identities will become infused 
with negativity, which then spills over into other identities related to the affected identity, 
leading to a larger overall shift in self-evaluation. That is, the impact of failure feedback 
in one aspect of the self will spread to other aspects depending on the strength of their 
relatedness. Conversely, the impact of success feedback in one aspect of the self will also 
spread to other closely related aspects. Linville (1980) proposed that overall affect and 
self-appraisal are a weighted average of the affect and self-appraisal associated with 
one’s individual aspects. Important or salient self-aspects receive more weight in this 
averaging process (Linville, 1980). The independence of self-aspects in the structure of 
the self-representation of individuals with high self-complexity will buffer the negative 
consequences of failure feedback on overall affect and self-evaluation. The overall affect 
and self-appraisal of individuals low in self-complexity, however, will undergo a larger 
shift in evaluation due to the impact of the interrelatedness of self-aspects and spreading 
negativity in this averaging process. This shift will from here on be referred to as a 
change in evaluation. Self-aspects that are more closely related to the stress and support 
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receipt domain will undergo a larger negative shift in their evaluation than will self-
aspects more loosely related to the stress and support receipt domain. 
Another mechanism by which self-complexity may exert its effects on affect and 
self-evaluation following failure feedback is through a reorganization of the structure of 
the self-representation. This reorganization will from here on be referred to as a change in 
centrality. That is, individuals may diminish the centrality of the threatened identity, at 
least temporarily. This reorganization may also involve increasing the centrality of one or 
several other identities in the structure of the self-representation. By reducing the 
centrality of the threatened identity, this identity will have less weight in the averaging 
process described by Linville (1980), thereby preserving overall affect and self-appraisal. 
Because of the greater number of self-aspects possessed by individuals high in self-
complexity, these individuals are likely to have more flexibility in this reorganization 
process than would individuals low in self-complexity with fewer self-aspects. To this 
end, individuals high in self-complexity may be better equipped to escape the potentially 
negative consequences of support receipt by reducing the centrality of the threatened self-
aspect and/or increasing the centrality of one or several other identities than would 
individuals low in self-complexity.  
A third possibility is that those high in self-complexity have a compensatory 
process that bolsters the positivity of the non-threatened identities to minimize costs of 
failure feedback. This bolstering is also a change in evaluation, however, it involves 
increasing the positivity of non-threatened identities. By increasing the positivity of self-
aspects other than the salient identity, the negativity of the threatened identity has less of 
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an impact in the weighting and averaging process described by Linville (1980) that 
determines overall affect and self-representation. Again, individuals high in self-
complexity may me more capable of this bolstering process than are individuals low in 
self-complexity due to the larger number of self-aspects they possess for which they can 
bolster the positivity of, thereby reducing the impact of failure feedback. All of these 
possibilities are examined in the current study. No hypotheses were made as to which of 
the above described mechanisms would account for the affective consequences of self-
complexity as we believed that more than one or a combination of mechanisms might be 
involved in the relationship between self-complexity and health and well-being. 
Current study 
 The present research aims to extend the literature on enacted support by 
examining self-complexity as a possible moderator of responses to support receipt in self-
relevant domains. In addition, the current study attempts to add to the literature on self-
complexity by directly examining the purported cognitive mechanisms by which self-
complexity moderates affective reactions to negative stressful events. One plausible 
sequence is as follows. Receipt of support in a domain for which personal efficacy and 
autonomy are important may be interpreted by the recipient as indicating that his/her own 
efforts and abilities were insufficient (Burke, Ignarri, & Goren; under revision). Such 
negative feedback should lead to negative thoughts and feelings about the self, with the 
domain in which the negative stressful event occurs and the identity associated with that 
domain being particularly affected. The extent to which this failure feedback affects the 
recipient’s overall affect and self-appraisal will depend on two factors: the extent to 
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which failure feedback in the self-aspect related to the support domain represents the total 
self and the extent to which this negative event colors the affect and self-appraisal of all 
the aspects that make up the complete self-representation (Linville, 1980). Individuals 
with low self-complexity, who possess a low number of self-aspects and/or whose 
aspects are highly interrelated, should react more negatively to support receipt in a self-
relevant domain as assessed by changes in affect and self-appraisal than should 
individuals with high self-complexity (Linville, 1980).  
Following from this, to the extent that support receipt in self-relevant domains 
delivers the sense that one’s own efforts and abilities were insufficient, self-complexity 
as an individual difference factor may account for some of the variability in the 
consequences that follow from support receipt in self-relevant domains (Burke and 
Perndorfer, in prep.). For people high in self-complexity, the impact of the negative 
appraisal of support receipt will be a smaller proportion of their total selves and more 
confined to the self-aspect associated with the salient domain and will therefore affect a 
smaller part of their self-representation. The unaffected self-aspects will serve as buffers 
against the negative effects of the stressful event on these individuals’ overall affect and 
self-appraisal. For individuals low in self-complexity, however, the impact of the 
negative appraisal of support receipt will be a larger proportion of their total selves and 
this negativity will diffuse on to other aspects (change in evaluation) because of their 
interrelatedness. Individuals high in self-complexity may also be better equipped to 
escape the negative effects of support receipt in self-relevant domains by having the 
greater ability to reorganize the structure of their self-representation (change in centrality) 
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and more self-aspects for which they can increase the positivity of (change in evaluation) 
to buffer the impact of the negative evaluation of support receipt in a self-relevant 
domain. The current studies test the prediction that individuals high in self-complexity 
will be less affected by failure feedback, or support receipt in self-relevant domains, and 
the purported cognitive mechanisms by which stressful events may differentially affect 
individuals high vs. low in self-complexity. 
Pilot Testing 
 Pilot testing was performed using Amazon mTurk to examine the effectiveness of 
the novel self-complexity measure and the feasibility of a two-session self-complexity 
study that is entirely online. Because Study One does not include social support receipt or 
interaction with the experimenter, the original hopes were to run the study entirely online 
using Amazon mTurk workers. In total, 150 Amazon mTurk workers completed some 
form of a self-complexity measure. Several adjustments to the self-complexity measure 
were made during this pilot testing. The original self-complexity measure had 
participants provide a self-aspect and then select the traits relating to that self-aspect 
before moving on to define another self-aspect of their self-representation. We found that 
with this format, participants were not producing numbers of self-aspects comparable to 
past studies of self-complexity. That participants reported low numbers of self-aspects 
using the original format of the self-complexity measure was likely due to the nature of 
Amazon mTurk studies and their workers. That is, Amazon mTurk workers maximize 
their time and gain by completing studies quickly and likely realized that the trait 
selection and importance to identity questions followed each identity they provided and 
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thus stopped listing identities quickly or did not think thoroughly about all of their 
potential self-aspects. The final self-complexity measure asked participants to spend two 
minutes thinking of all their self-aspects and had participants list all of their self-aspects 
at once before introducing the trait selection and importance to identity questions for each 
self-aspect. The instructions to the self-complexity measure were also changed during the 
pilot testing to further clarify what a self-aspect is and to garner a larger number of self-
aspects listed by participants. 
 As previously mentioned, the pilot testing also served to examine the feasibility of 
a two-session self-complexity study that is entirely online. One hundred participants 
successfully completed the final measure of self-complexity, which garnered numbers of 
self-aspects typical of past self-complexity research. In order to customize the materials 
for part two of the study and to send this unique survey link to each participant the data 
from each participant’s self-complexity measure had to be identified in some way. 
Participants were instructed to e-mail the lab with the unique ID code provided to them in 
the self-complexity measure. However, many participants failed to e-mail their ID code. 
Even when participants e-mailed the lab with their unique ID code it proved difficult to 
get these participants to complete part two of the study. These troubles resulted in a lot of 
sunken time and costs in terms of customizing the materials for each participant and 
compensating participants for the completion of the self-complexity measurement. In 
sum, the pilot testing done through Amazon mTurk helped to refine the self-complexity 
measure that was then used in both Study One and Study Two. The pilot testing in 
Amazon mTurk also discounted the feasibility of completing a two-part study online 
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using Amazon mTurk workers, especially a study in which part two of the study is unique 
for each individual.  
 In addition to the pilot testing done online through Amazon mTurk, 25 
participants were run through two variations of Study Two to finalize the procedures for 
the study. The participants for this pilot testing were students recruited from summer 
Psychology courses at Lehigh University and were compensated with extra credit 
towards their course grade. The purpose of the in lab pilot testing was to examine the 
validity of the speech task used in Study Two. The speech task used in Study Two is a 
variation of a standardized stress task in which participants are told that they will be 
writing and presenting a speech that will be video recorded. Typically, this task requires 
participants to write the speech. Instead, we had participants come up with 15 pieces of 
evidence for the speech, ostensibly as preparation for the eventual speech writing. We 
chose to have participants complete this variation of the speech task because we wanted 
the support manipulation to be in relation to the identity (i.e., support for not being able 
to come up with pieces of evidence as to why your self-relevant identity is 
important/beneficial) instead of being support for speech writing abilities. This pilot 
testing suggested that the variation of the speech task used in Study Two was effective in 
eliciting distress. Specifically, although the effects were not significant with such a small 
sample, each of the outcome variables was trending in the predicted direction, providing 







The purpose of Study One was to replicate the results of past studies of self-
complexity using novel measures and a modified procedure.  Additionally, Study One 
provided the first opportunity to examine the purported cognitive mechanisms by which 
self-complexity may result in affective consequences.  
In the first part of a two-part study, we assessed self-complexity and the 
importance of each self-aspect that subjects generated. In a separate laboratory session, 
participants completed an eclectic series of ambiguous and difficult tasks for which the 
self-relevance was manipulated. Participants then received either failure or success 
feedback regarding their performance on these tasks. Participants completed a mood 
measure, a global self-evaluation measure, and implicit centrality to identity and 
evaluation of identities measures both prior to and following the completion of the task 
block and receipt of failure/success feedback. 
Using the novel measures and modified procedure, we expected to replicate the 
results of Linville (1980): individuals low in self-complexity should experience more 
extreme affect and self-evaluation following a failure or success experience than would 
individuals high in self-complexity. More specifically, we hypothesized that individuals 
low in self-complexity would experience more negative affect and self-evaluation 
following failure feedback than would individuals high in self-complexity. This increased 
negative affect experienced by individuals low in self-complexity after receiving failure 
feedback should be especially high for individuals in the self-relevant domain condition. 
 25 
 
That is, we expect participants low in self-complexity to react more negatively to failure 
feedback in a self-relevant domain than participants high in self-complexity. In contrast, 
individuals low in self-complexity will experience more positive affect and self-
evaluation following success feedback than will individuals high in self-complexity. In 
addition, we expected to find that shifts in evaluation and identity centrality could help to 
explain the results from the self-report measures. 
Method 
Participants and design. Ninety Lehigh University undergraduate students 
participated as part of the research participation requirement for an introductory 
psychology course. Of the 90 participants originally recruited for the study, 77 completed 
both parts of the study successfully. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 22 (M = 18.9) 
with approximately 70 percent of the participants (N = 54) being female. The majority of 
participants identified themselves as being White (N = 74). Participants were 
compensated with 0.5 credits for each part of the two-part study completed to put towards 
their course research participation requirement.  
The study had a 2 (task self-relevance: self-relevant or not self-relevant) x 2 
(feedback: failure or success) experimental design, with self-complexity as a measured 
moderator. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: self-
relevant failure, self-relevant success, not self-relevant failure, or not self-relevant 
success. As previously mentioned, the study was a two-part study in which participants 
completed an online self-complexity measure that assessed participant demographics, 
self-complexity (both number of identities and their interrelatedness), and importance to 
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identity prior to the laboratory session. The two-part nature of this study allowed the 
framing of the task block and implicit measure used in the laboratory session to be 
customized for each participant according to the data from the online self-complexity 
measure. Particularly, the self-aspects indicated as being a part of each individual’s self-
representation and the importance of these aspects were used to determine the framing of 
the task block and were incorporated into the implicit measure of change in centrality to 
identity and change in evaluation of identities. 
Measures 
Part one. 
Self-complexity. The self-complexity measure used in this study was a novel 
measure, but loosely based on the traditional card sorting task used to measure self-
complexity (Dixon & Baumeister, 1991; Linville, 1980, 1987; Luo & Watkins) and more 
recent forms of assessment (Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008; Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & 
Revelle, 1999) described in the self-complexity literature. The prompt for the self-
complexity measure was borrowed from a study by Brook, Garcia, and Fleming (2008) 
on the effects of multiple identities on psychological well-being. The prompt read:  
“We all have various aspects of our identity and how we think about ourselves. 
Some of these are related to groups, such as gender, race/ethnicity, religion, 
politics, nationality, sports teams, work, social/academic clubs, families, friends, 
and so forth. Others are related to roles such as student, sibling, parent, employee, 
friend, significant other, club or team member, and so on. For example, Christy is 
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a friend, sister, African American, psychology major, member of the student 
council, member of the track team and member of a sorority. 
Please pause for a minute or two to think about the roles and identities that are 
IMPORTANT TO YOU. Try to think of at least four. You can list as many as 
fifteen.  
Please list your roles and identities below using one or two words. You can list 
the identities and roles in any order.”  
Participants were asked to list at least four self-aspects, but could list up to as 
many as 15. Four identities were required by each participant in order to make up the 
implicit measure for the laboratory session described in further detail below. The decision 
to create a ceiling of 15 identities was informed using the data from past studies on self-
complexity (e.g., Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008; Dixon & Baumeister, 1991; Linville, 
1980, 1987). For example, Brook, Garcia, and Fleming (2008) reported that a sample of 
159 undergraduates listed a range of zero to fifteen identities each, with a median of 6. 
Only 4.1% of this sample listen more than 12 identities, with only 9% listing 12 (Brook, 
Garcia, & Fleming, 2008).  
To assess the interrelatedness of self-aspects, participants then chose traits 
relating to their role in each of the listed identities. The interrelatedness of self-aspects 
was measured by examining the degree of overlap between the traits chosen for each self-
aspect. That is, more unique self-aspects will share fewer traits with other self-aspects. A 
more detailed explanation of how self-complexity was computed can be found in the 
Analytic Approach section of the Results section this study. Participants were instructed 
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to choose at least two traits for each identity, that they did not need to choose all of the 
traits, and that they could use the same traits to describe their role in different identities. 
The 44 traits provided were the same as those used by Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, and Revelle 
(1999), who selected them to include markers of the Big-5 personality dimensions 
(Goldberg, 1991), as well as constructs that fall outside of that framework. The 44 traits 
consist of 23 positively valenced adjectives (e.g., optimistic, loyal, ambitious, 
considerate, helpful) and 21 negatively valenced adjectives (e.g., boring, selfish, lazy, 
unintelligent, immature). Taken together, the number of identities and traits provided for 
each created a self-complexity measure that took into account both the number of 
identities in the self-representation and their overlap. 
Identity importance. The importance of each identity in representing the overall 
self was measured by both a rank order and the Importance to Identity subscale of the 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). After listing all of the 
self-aspects that make up their self-representation, participants created a rank order these 
identities in the order of their importance in representing the overall self. Specifically, the 
prompt read as follows: 
“Earlier you were asked to think about the aspects of your identity that are 
important to you and were asked to list these identities and traits related to them. 
Some identities may be more important in representing ourselves than are others. 
Please rank order the identities you previously listed in the order of their 
importance in representing your overall self. Please form this list based on your 
own opinion of yourself.” 
 29 
 
In addition to the rank order, participants also completed the four-item Importance 
to Identity subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES; Luhtanen & Crocker, 
1992) for each identity listed during the self-complexity measure. This subscale has been 
used to assess the importance of identities in representing the overall self in past research 
on self-complexity (Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008). The piped text feature in Qualtrics 
inserted the name of each identity participants had listed in the self-complexity measure 
into each of the four items of this subscale. The four items read: “Overall, my identity 
[identity inserted here] has very little to do with how I feel about myself” (reversed), 
“The identity [insertion] is an important reflection of who I am,” “The identity [insertion] 
is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am” (reversed), and “In general, the 
identity [insertion] is an important part of my self-image.” Responses were made using a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strong agree (7). Responses to 
each of the four importance items were averaged for each identity to create an importance 
score for each identity. The Importance to Identity subscale provided an additional 
measure of the importance of various identities in representing the self rather than using 
the rank order to determine this alone. 
Part two. 
Mood. An adaptation to the Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & 
Droppleman, 1971) was used to assess changes in mood following the task block and 
failure/success manipulation. The measure consists of 14 items that measure five target 
moods, each being represented by three or four items as follows: anxious mood (on edge, 
uneasy, and anxious), depressed mood (sad, discouraged, hopeless, and blue), anger 
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(resentful, angry, and annoyed), fatigue (worn out, exhausted, and fatigued), and vigor 
(cheerful vigorous, and lively). Participants rated the extent to which they were 
experiencing the feelings at that moment along a computerized visual analog scale both 
before and after the task block and performance feedback. The visual analog scale 
appeared as a horizontal line on the computer screen with anchors at “not at all” and 
“extremely” and participants clicked the appropriate point along the line to indicate how 
they were feeling at that moment. Responses were recorded electronically with values in 
the range of 0 to 100, with higher values representing higher levels of the state. A visual 
analog scale was chosen over a Likert scale in order to detect more subtle changes in 
mood following the task block and feedback manipulation. Current distress was 
operationalized as the anxiety and depression subscales of the POMS. Responses to these 
seven items were averaged to form indices of current distress both before and after the 
task block and failure/success feedback in order to obtain mood change scores. In 
addition to distress, also relevant to the current research was the vigor subscale of the 
POMS. The POMS has been shown to be reliably sensitive to individual differences in 
individual mood changes over time (Cranford, Shrout, Iida, Rafaeli, Yip, & Bolger; 
2006) and is the same mood measure used by Burke and Perndorfer (in prep.) to assess 
mood changes associated with support receipt in domains varying in self-relevance. 
Self-evaluation. Self-esteem was assessed using the Rosenberg self-esteem scale 
(RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). The scale is a ten-item scale that measures state self-esteem by 
asking participants to respond how they are currently feeling. Items (e.g., On the whole I 
am satisfied with myself; I feel that I have a number of good qualities; I certainly feel 
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useless at times) are answered on a four-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. The RSES has been used in past studies of self-complexity (e.g., Luo 
& Watkins) and is the same self-evaluation measure used by Burke and Perndorfer (in 
prep.) to assess changes in self-evaluation associated with support receipt in domains 
varying in self-relevance. 
Implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities. The implicit centrality 
to identity and evaluation of identities measure was used to examine the purported 
cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may result in affective consequences 
following negative stressful events. Specifically, the implicit centrality to identity and 
evaluation of identities measures were derived from an Implicit Association Task (IAT; 
Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) created using four “Me,” or self-relevant identities 
and four “Not me,” or not self-relevant identities for each participant. Please see the 
section titled Analytic Approach for more detail as to how the centrality to identity and 
evaluation of identity measure was scored to examine these cognitive mechanisms, and 
see Appendix A for more detail on how the "Me" and "Not me" identities were selected 
for each subject.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: self-relevant 
failure, self-relevant success, not self-relevant failure, or not self-relevant success. All 
participants completed the self-complexity measure online through the web survey 
program Qualtrics approximately 1-2 weeks prior to the laboratory session. Rafaeli-Mor, 
Gotlib, and Revelle (1999) concluded through a split-half reliability analysis that all 
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measures of self-complexity show strong temporal stability as long as the form of 
measurement includes both positively and negatively valenced items (as was included in 
our measurement of self-complexity). 
Part two of the study consisted of a 30 minute in-lab session. The experimenter 
greeted participants upon entering the lab and presented them with the informed consent 
form. After signing the informed consent form participants were directed to a computer 
where they completed the pre-task mood, self-evaluation, and implicit centrality to 
identity and evaluation of identities measures before moving on to the task block. The 
mood measure, self-evaluation measure, task block, and performance feedback took place 
in the web survey program Qualtrics while the implicit centrality to identity and 
evaluation of identity measure was completed in DirectRT.  
The task block and performance feedback for these tasks allowed for the 
manipulation of both self-relevance and failure/success. The introduction to the task 
block read as follows: 
“The next part of this survey contains a diverse array of exercises that we have 
developed to measure ability in a number of different dimensions within a short 
period of time. 
We ask that you try your best on all items. Upon completion of these tasks, your 
responses will be scored by our algorithms and you will receive feedback in the 




Specifically, your percentile score will reflect your performance relative to all 
individuals who indicated [insert self-relevant or not-self relevant identity here] as 
being an important attribute domain in the original survey. 
This may or may not be one of the domains you listed for yourself in the original 
survey.” 
 As described, the task block was made up of an eclectic series of ambiguous and 
difficult tasks that participants were falsely led to believe were a measure of ability in a 
number of different domains. The task block was made up of a subword task, an 
alternative uses task, a task involving the assignment of traits to computerized faces, 
questions regarding one’s disagreements and experiences in close relationships, and 
finally, a novel task claiming to be a test of hand-eye coordination and motor reflexes. 
All of these tasks will be described in further detail below.  
 The subword task is similar to an anagrams task, but diverges in that one can use 
some instead of all of the letters provided to form a word, or subword. The prompt for 
this task read: 
“The following groups of letters can be rearranged to form a number of English 
words using either all or some of the letters. For each group of letters, you will 
have 30 seconds to generate as many words of at least three letters as you can. 
Your score for this task is based on number, length, and uniqueness of the words 
you generate. 
For example, from the letters CEBRA, you could form the words brace, crab, 
care, bear, bar, arc, cab, etc.” 
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Participants were given two strings of letters (RECSNAPA and 
ALEIMCGNMOAA) and were instructed to come up with as many subwords for each of 
these strings of letters as possible within 30 seconds per string.  
The alternative uses task was drawn from Guilford’s Alternative Uses Task 
(1967), originally designed as a measure of flexibility in thinking in an investigation of 
creative thinking. In this task, participants were given a common object and were asked 
to list as many unconventional uses for that object as possible. For example, alternative 
uses for a brick could be a paperweight, a doorstop, a mock coffin at a Barbie funeral, to 
throw through a window, to use as a weapon, and to hit my sister with. Participants were 
asked to come up with as many alternative uses as possible for a paperclip and pillow, 
with a 30 second time limit imposed on the response time for each item. Participants were 
led to believe that their responses to these items would be scored based on four 
components: originality (uncommon responses relative to the responses provided by all 
participants), fluency (the number of alternative uses created), flexibility (the number of 
different categories of uses created; e.g., the uses “to use as a weapon” and “to hit my 
sister with” would be considered as part of the same category: weapon), and elaboration 
(the amount of detail provided in each response).  
Next, participants completed a novel task that was portrayed as being a test of 
nonverbal sensitivity. For this task, participants were shown two computer generated 
faces and asked to rate the degree to which each of the faces portrayed a number of traits 
on a scale provided. Specifically, the description of the task read: 
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“Now we will turn to a test of nonverbal sensitivity. We will test your accuracy in 
decoding nonverbal affective cues.  
You will be asked to rate a series of computer generated faces on a number of 
traits. Please rate the degree to which you believe each face portrays the following 
traits on the scale provided: attractive, competent, trustworthy, dominant, mean, 
frightening, extraverted, threatening, and likeable. 
Your response will be compared to normative ratings and expert evaluations to 
determine your score. You will have 10 seconds to view each face, followed by 
20 seconds to make your ratings.” 
Participants rated the faces according to these traits on a visual analog scale 
similar to that used in the POMS. The two computer generated faces were chosen from a 
database of 300 Caucasian faces that were randomly generated using the Facegen 
Modeller program (http://facegen.com) Version 3.1. The exact procedures are described 
in Oosterhof and Todorov (2008). 
Following the “test of nonverbal sensitivity,” participants answered a series of 
questions regarding their disagreements and experiences in close relationships. First, 
participants rated the approximate extent of agreement or disagreement in general 
between them and their close others for a series of topics. Note that participants were told 
that the term “close others” is not restricted to romantic partners, but also includes family 
and friends. The topics for which participants rated their extent of agreement or 
disagreement with their close others were: financial matters, religion, aims, goals, and 
things believed to be important, and leisure time interests and activities. These topics 
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were chosen to represent topics for which family and friends, instead of just romantic 
partners, may have disagreements over. Participants rated their extent of agreement or 
disagreement with their close others on these topics on a 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from always agree to always disagree. Second, participants rated how much they agreed 
or disagreed with a series of statements regarding how they generally experience close 
relationships. These statements were taken from the Experiences in Close Relationships 
Scale (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) and were as follows: my close others make me 
doubt myself, my desire to be very close to people sometimes scares people away, it 
helps to turn to my close others in times of need, and I prefer not to show my close others 
how I feel deep down. Again, it was made clear that close relationships include romantic 
partners, family members, friends, etc. Participants rated their extent of agreement or 
disagreement with the above statements on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. 
Finally, participants completed a novel task claiming to be a measure of hand eye 
coordination and motor reflexes. The “motor task” required participants to use the 
computer mouse to click as close to the center of circles that would quickly appear and 
disappear in a random pattern across the computer screen. Participants were instructed 
that both their speed and accuracy would determine their overall score on this task.  
While some of the tasks in the task block were inspired by real psychological 
measures it is important to note that the task block and the “measures” in it were not 
indicative of one’s ability in any domain. In fact, participants’ performance on these 
measures was never calculated nor examined. The importance of the task block was to 
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create a difficult exercise that could be framed as being a measure of ability in a number 
of different domains as to accommodate the diversity of self-aspects generated by 
participants. The tasks incorporated in the task block were chosen to represent a number 
of different domains in which participants could have reported having roles and identities 
in. Such domains include academic/intelligence (i.e., the subword task), creativity (i.e., 
the alternative uses task), social/relational (i.e., the test of nonverbal sensitivity and the 
disagreements and experiences in close relationships questions), and 
athleticism/coordination domains (the hand eye coordinator and motor reflex task).  
The framing of the task block and performance feedback was manipulated by 
leading participants to believe that their performance feedback on these tasks was a 
percentile ranking relative to all individuals who indicated a certain self-aspect as being 
an important attribute domain in the original survey. For participants in the self-relevant 
domain condition, this self-aspect was typically the first self-aspect listed in their rank 
order in the self-complexity measure. For example, a participant who indicated “math 
major” as being the most important self-aspect in representing the overall self was told 
that his/her performance on the task block was a percentile ranking relative to all 
individuals who indicated “math major” as being important to their self-representation. 
For participants in the not self-relevant domain condition this self-aspect was an identity 
from the same basic identity group as their first rank ordered identity, but an identity 
listed by another participant and not held by this particular participant and thus, not self-
relevant. The exact procedures for the identity organization and selection are described in 





 percentile relative to individuals who listed the above described self-aspect as 
being an important attribute domain in the original survey. Participants in the failure 
feedback condition were told that they scored in the 15
th
 percentile. To ensure that 
participants understood what “their score” meant the feedback included this description: 
“This percentile score is a ranking of your ability relative to these individuals. It 
gives the proportion of the population for which your ability level is higher in this 
domain, so a higher number represents a higher ability level.” 
Participants completed the mood, self-evaluation, and implicit centrality to 
identity and evaluation of identities measures a second time after completing the task 
block and receiving performance feedback. Participants were debriefed and thanked upon 
completion of the lab session. 
Results 
Analytic Approach  
 Self-complexity score. To compute self-complexity for each subject, the number 
of identities each participant listed as being a part of their self-representation was first 
collected from the rank order. Next, the total frequency that each of the 44 traits was 
chosen to describe participants’ roles or identities was calculated. Remember that traits 
could be used more than once to describe different roles and identities. The uniqueness of 
each trait was calculated with the formula: 1 – (frequency of that trait – 1)/number of ids. 
Thus, traits that were used to describe more roles or identities received less weight than 
were traits used only once. These trait uniqueness scores could range between 1/15 (for a 
trait used to describe 15 out of 15 identities) to 1 (for a trait used only once). Then, the 
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uniqueness of each identity was calculated by averaging the uniqueness scores for each of 
the traits selected for that identity. Thus, an identity was rated as more unique to the 
extent that its constituent traits were infrequently used to describe other identities. 
Finally, self-complexity was calculated by summing the uniqueness score for each 
identity to create a final self-complexity score. Thus, a participant who listed 15 identities 
and used unique identities to describe each identity would earn a high self-complexity 
score as compared to a participant who listed only four identities and chose the same trait 
to represent these roles.  
 Changes in the centrality of identities in representing the self and the 
evaluation of identities. Changes in the centrality of identities in representing the overall 
self and the evaluation of identities from pre to post was calculated using data from the 
"Me" / "Not me" IAT described earlier. The IAT was made up of seven blocks – two of 
which were used to calculate changes in the centrality of identities in representing the 
overall self from pre to post and four of which were used to calculate changes in the 
evaluation of identities from pre to post. Block two of the measure was not used in the 
analyses as this block only required participants to categorize words as being “good” or 
“bad” and thus did not include any information about participants’ self-aspects. In line 
with the scoring algorithm described by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) all 
reaction times greater than 10 seconds were dropped from the analyses. Similarly, all 
reaction times less than 300 milliseconds were categorized as fast trials. The mean 
number of fast trials for each participant was calculated. The data was dropped for 
participants whose fast trials made up more than 10% of their responses. Per the 
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recommendation of Greenwald et al., we retained incorrect trials, replacing their reaction 
times with the mean reaction time for correct trials for that subject plus a 600-millisecond 
penalty.  
 The logic behind the implicit centrality measure is that participants should more 
quickly categorize identities as being “Me” when they are in fact self-relevant identities 
and when these identities are more central to the overall representation of the self. We 
calculated implicit centrality to identity using the data from blocks one and five of the 
IAT. In these blocks, participants categorized the four “Me,” or self-relevant and four 
“Not Me,” or not self-relevant identities as being “Me” or “Not Me.” The mean reaction 
time for each “Me” identity was calculated so that a mean reaction time existed for 
identities Me1, Me2, Me3 and Me4, with identity Me1 being the first identity listed in the 
rank order of importance in representing the overall self. The reaction times for the four 
“Not Me” identities were grouped together as one mean as there was no conceivable 
reason to examine the speed with which participants categorized different not self-
relevant identities. Centrality to identity was calculated as how quickly, on average, one 
categorized that “Me” identity as compared to the average speed with which one 
categorized all of the “Not Me” identities (e.g., centrality of Me1 = average reaction time 
for “Not me” identities – average reaction time for Me1). We chose to incorporate the 
reaction time to "Not me" identities in this way to account for basic individual differences 
in speed of responding. Thus, higher numbers indicated greater centrality in representing 
the overall self.  Change in centrality was calculated by subtracting the pre task centrality 
score from the post task centrality score. Negative change in centrality scores thus 
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indicated a drop in the centrality of an identity from pre to post and positive change in 
centrality scores indicated an increase in the centrality of an identity in representing the 
overall self from pre to post.  
 Consistent with the logic behind a standard IAT, the logic behind the implicit 
evaluation measure is that participants should be more quick to categorize a “Me” 
identity as being self-relevant when the “Me” anchor is paired with “good” than when it 
is paired with “bad” to the extent that this identity is imbued with implicit positivity. We 
calculated implicit evaluation scores using blocks three, four, six, and seven of the IAT. 
Participants categorized both words as being “good” and “bad” and identities as being 
“Me” and “Not me” during these blocks. Blocks three and four were congruent trials in 
which the anchors “good” and “Me” were paired together while the anchors “bad” and 
“Not Me” were paired together. Blocks six and seven were incongruent trials in that 
“good” was no paired with “Not me” and “bad” with “Me.” The change in the evaluation 
of identities scores were computed using a modification to the scoring algorithm 
recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) with the key difference being 
that rather than grouping the self-relevant, or “Me” identities together, we examined the 
change in the evaluation of identities separately for each “Me” identity (Me1, Me2, Me3, 
and Me4). Thus, we used a modified scoring algorithm to derive separate change in 
evaluation scores for each identity. Details regarding this modified scoring algorithm are 
available upon request. 
 Analyses. We used general linear models to examine the effect of self-
complexity, self-relevance, and performance feedback and their interactions in predicting 
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changes in the set of outcome variables described above. In each case, we adjusted for the 
average of the pre and post levels of the variable of interest. Both that average and self-
complexity were centered at the grand mean before being entered into the analyses. The 
outcome variables were change in distress, change in self-evaluation, change in vigor, 
change in the centrality of the Me1 identity, change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity, 
change in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined, and change in the 
evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined. The significant results from 
these analyses will be described below, and non-significant results are reported in 
Appendix B. 
Results of analyses 
 Descriptive analyses. The mean number of self-aspects reported by participants 
in Study One was 6.99 with a standard deviation of 2.6. Although participants were 
instructed to list at least four self-aspects the minimum for the range of identities listed 
was three with the maximum being 15, or the ceiling. Men (M = 6.91) and women (M = 
7.02) reported a similar number of identities. Using the calculation of self-complexity 
described in the Analytic Approach section above, which took both the number of self-
aspects and their interrelatedness into account, participants in Study One had a mean self-
complexity score of 4.58 with a standard deviation of 1.87. The range for the self-
complexity scores of participants in Study One was 1.48 to 10.95. Change in distress. 
Looking first at change in distress, we expected to find a three-way interaction between 
self-complexity, self-relevance, and performance feedback, such that negative feedback 
in a self-relevant domain is less impactful for individuals high vs. low in self-complexity. 
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The results of the analyses indicate that there were no significant main effects or 
interactions in predicting change in distress (Fs < 3.04, ps > .086). Figure 1 shows the 
pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in self-evaluation. We expected the same pattern of results for change in 
self-evaluation as we did for change in distress: a three-way interaction between self-
complexity, self-relevance, and feedback, such that negative feedback in a self-relevant 
domain would be less impactful for individuals high as compared to individuals low in 
self-complexity. The results of the analyses indicate that there were no main effects of 
self-complexity, self-relevance, or performance feedback in predicting changes in self-
evaluation (Fs < 1.28, ps > .253). Similarly, the two- and three-way interactions were 
also not significant (Fs < 014, ps > .705). Figure 2 shows the pattern of results for 
individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
Change in vigor. We expected the pattern of results for change in vigor from pre 
to post to essentially be the opposite of that for change in distress and change in self-
evaluation: a significant three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, 
and performance feedback such that positive feedback in a self-relevant domain would be 
less impactful for individuals high vs. low in self-complexity. The two-way interaction 
between self-complexity and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 11.24, p= .009) was 
significant. To better understand this interaction we reran the analyses two times, once 
with self-complexity centered one standard deviation below its mean and once with 
standard deviation centered above its mean. The simple effect of feedback was significant 
for participants both low (F(1,67) = 7.68, p=.007) and high in self-complexity (F(1,67) = 
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4.05, p=.048). The simple effect of feedback, however, was in the opposite directions for 
participants low vs. high in self-complexity. That is, participants low in self-complexity 
exhibited a greater decrease in vigor associated with failure feedback whereas 
participants high in self-complexity exhibited a greater decrease in vigor associated with 
success feedback. 
This two-way interaction was qualified by a significant three-way interaction 
between self-relevance, self-complexity, and performance feedback (F(1,67) = 19.81, p < 
.0001). To better understand this three-way interaction we first looked to see whether the 
simple two-way interaction of self-relevance by performance feedback was significant for 
both participants low and high in self-complexity. The results of the analyses indicated 
that the simple two-way interaction between self-relevance and feedback was significant 
for participants both low (F(1,67) = 5.81, p=.019) and high in self-complexity (F(1, 67) = 
15.28, p.0002). To further probe this interaction we examined the simple effects feedback 
for the self-relevant and not self-relevant domain condition for participants both low and 
high in self-complexity. We found no effect of feedback regardless of self-complexity in 
the not self-relevant domain condition (Fs < 2.18, ps > 0.144). However, for the self-
relevant domain condition, there were significant effects of performance feedback 
consistent with the two-way interaction described above. This finding suggests that the 
two-way interaction between self-complexity and performance feedback described above 
was driven by the self-relevant domain condition. None of the main effects or the 
remaining two-way interactions were significant (Fs < 1.21, ps > .276). Figure 3 shows 
the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
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 Change in the centrality of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self. 
The change in the centrality of the Me1 identity and the results that follow were 
measured using the implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities task. This 
task was designed to examine the cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may 
result in affective consequences following failure or success feedback. No hypotheses 
were made as to which of the proposed mechanisms or results might be involved in the 
relationship between self-complexity and affective consequences. None of the predictors 
of change in the centrality of the Me1 identity were significant (Fs < 2.67, ps > .107). 
Figure 4 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on 
self-complexity. 
 Change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity. As for the change in the 
centrality of Me1 in representing the overall self, we did not have specific predictions for 
the pattern of results for the change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity from pre to post. 
Neither the main effects of self-complexity, self-relevance, and performance feedback 
nor their interactions were predictive of change in evaluation of the Me1 identity from 
pre to post (Fs <  3.04, ps < .086). Figure 5 shows the pattern of results for individuals 
low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined in 
representing the overall self. The change in centrality scores for identities Me2, Me3, 
and Me4 were averaged together instead of individually examining changes in the 
centrality of these three identities in representing the self to improve our power to detect 
a small effect. None of the main effects nor interactions were predictive of change in the 
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centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined in representing the overall self 
from pre to post (Fs < 3.48, ps > .067). Figure 6 shows the pattern of results for 
individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the evaluation of the M2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined. 
Similarly, the change in the evaluation scores for identities Me2, Me3, and Me4 were 
averaged together instead of individually examining the changes in the evaluation of 
these non-focal identities. Of these analyses the main effect of performance feedback was 
significant (F (1,67) = 5.04, p = .028), such that participants in the failure feedback 
condition experienced a greater decrease in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 
identities combined from pre to post than did participants in the success feedback 
condition. The remaining main effects and interactions, however, were not significant (Fs 
< 2.39, ps < .137). Figure 7 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and 
high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
Discussion 
 The self-complexity measure used in this study was a novel measure, but loosely 
based on the traditional card sorting task used to measure self-complexity (Dixon & 
Baumeister, 1991; Linville, 1980, 1987; Luo & Watkins) and more recent forms of 
assessment (Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008; Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & Revelle, 1999) 
described in the self-complexity literature. Results of descriptive analyses indicate that 
the mean number of self-aspects reported by participants was 6.99 with a standard 
deviation of 2.6. The range of identities reported by participants was 3-15. The number of 
self-aspects reported by participants in this study was comparable to data from past 
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studies of self-complexity (e.g., Linville, 1980, 1987; Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008). 
For example, Linville (1980) found participants to create an average of 6.83 feature 
groups in the traditional card sorting task with a range of 3-21. Similarly, Brook, Garcia, 
and Fleming (2008) found that on average, a sample of 159 undergraduates reported a 
range of 0-15 identities with a mean of 6. These results suggest that the self-complexity 
measure developed for this study was able to elicit similar numbers of roles and identities 
than past measures of self-complexity.  
 The prediction central to this thesis is that individuals low in self-complexity 
would react more negatively to failure feedback than would participants high in self-
complexity, especially when that failure feedback occurred in a personally important 
domain. Negative reactivity to failure feedback was examined both in terms of changes in 
distress and changes in self-evaluation following the task block and performance 
feedback. Neither the two-way interaction between self-complexity and performance 
feedback nor the three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and 
performance feedback was found to be significant in predicting changes in distress or 
changes in self-evaluation. These results indicate that Study One was unable to replicate 
the results of past studies of self-complexity – that individuals low in self-complexity 
experience more negative affect following failure feedback than do individuals high in 
self-complexity. 
 While the focus of this thesis is on reactivity to failure feedback, or support 
receipt, in self-relevant domains, the self-complexity affective extremity hypothesis put 
forth by Linville (1980) holds that participants low in self-complexity, because they 
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experience more extreme affect in general following failure or success feedback, should 
also experience more positive reactivity to success feedback than would participants high 
in self-complexity. More positive reactivity to success feedback was measured in terms 
of changes in vigor as measured by the POMS, and changes in self-evaluation. The two-
way interaction between self-complexity and performance feedback was significant, 
however the pattern of these data require further examination. Exploration of the two-
way interaction revealed that while the effect of feedback was significant for participants 
both low and high in self-complexity, the patterns of results were in the opposite 
directions. Furthermore, the three-way interaction suggested that the two-way interaction 
was driven by the self-relevant domain condition. As expected, participants low in self-
complexity experienced a significant decrease in vigor associated with failure feedback. 
These results are consistent with our prediction that participants low in self-complexity 
would experience more negative affect following failure feedback in a self-relevant 
domain than would participants high in self-complexity. However, analyses examining 
the effect of feedback for participants high in self-complexity reveal a puzzling result. 
Participants high in self-complexity experienced a significant decrease in vigor associated 
with success feedback in the self-relevant condition. Future studies may determine if 
these results are replicable. As reported above, the two-way interaction between self-
complexity and performance feedback and the three-way interaction between self-
complexity, self-relevance, and performance feedback in predicting changes in self-
evaluation were also not significant. Thus, the results suggest that Study One was unable 
to corroborate the self-complexity affective extremity hypothesis (Linville, 1980), which 
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holds that participants low in self-complexity will experience more extreme affect 
following both failure and success feedback. 
 The implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities measures were used 
to examine the purported cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may result in 
affective extremity. We hypothesized that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the 
effect of self-complexity on affective extremity might include spill-over, or the degree to 
which feelings about an event related to one aspect of the self color the feelings about 
other aspects in the self-representation, changes in the centrality of identities in 
representing the overall self, and changes in the evaluation of identities. Specifically, we 
proposed that participants high in self-complexity might escape the negative effects of 
failure feedback, even in a personally important domain, by having less spill-over from 
the affected identity on to other aspects of the self, having the greater ability to reduce the 
centrality of the affected identity and/or increase the centrality of other identities in 
representing the self, and/or bolster the positivity of the evaluation of the unaffected 
identities to protect the overall self from negative evaluation. Of the analyses examining 
changes in the centrality of the Me1 identity, changes in the evaluation of the Me1 
identity, changes in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined, or 
changes in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined, only one 
significant effect emerged. In line with expectations, there was a significant main effect 
of performance feedback on the change in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 
identities combined such that participants experienced a greater decrease in the 
evaluation of these identities in response to failure than in response to success feedback. 
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While it is expected that participants might experience a decrease in the evaluation of 
their self-possessed identities in response to failure feedback, this is averaging across 
both self-complexity and self-relevance. These results suggest that participants did not 
increase or decrease the centrality of the focal identity in response to success or failure 
feedback, respectively, nor increase the centrality of the non-affected identities in 
representing the self following failure feedback. The results also suggest that participants 
did not change their evaluation of the Me1 identity following failure/success feedback. 
Thus, the cognitive mechanisms through which self-complexity has affected reactivity to 
failure/success feedback in past studies remain unexamined.  
The purpose of Study One was to replicate the results of past studies of self-
complexity using the novel measures and modified procedure described in this study.  
Additionally, Study One provided the first opportunity to examine the purported 
cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may result in affective consequences. 
Although a few significant effects emerged through data analysis, the pattern of results 
did not appear meaningful. A discussion as to why the results of this study do not 
replicate those of past studies of self-complexity, particularly Linville’s work (1980) on 
self-complexity and affective extremity, can be found in the General Discussion.  
Given that Study One was unable to replicate the findings of past studies of self-
complexity, this hampers our ability to test these hypotheses in the context of support 
receipt in Study Two. However, we still had reason to believe that Study Two could 
provide support for our hypotheses. As described in more detail in the General 
Discussion, an important limitation of Study One is that the task block may not have been 
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plausible as being a measure of ability in a number of different domains. While we 
attempted to combat this possibility by using an eclectic series of tasks including tasks 
resembling real psychological measures and by the nature in which we provided 
performance feedback, this limitation remains a possibility. Compared to the novel task 
block, the stressful speech task used in Study Two closely resembles those used to create 
a self-relevant stress context in past studies on the costs of support receipt (Bolger & 
Amarel, 2007). We therefore had reason to believe that the stressful speech task used to 
manipulate self-relevance and the self-relevance of the support manipulation in Study 
Two might better manipulate the relevant constructs. 
Study Two 
Overview 
 Study Two was designed to test the moderating effect of self-complexity on affect 
and self-appraisal in response to support receipt in a self-relevant domain delivered in an 
experimental setting. The study also attempted to examine the cognitive mechanisms by 
which self-complexity moderates affect and self-appraisal following negative stressful 
events. Study Two follows the same basic procedure as Study One except that the task 
block and failure/success feedback was replaced with a stressful speech task and support 
receipt manipulation. Like the task block, the self-relevance of the stressful speech task 
was manipulated using either self-aspects provided by that participant (self-relevant) or 
those provided by other participants (not self-relevant). As in Study One, participants 
completed a mood measure, a global self-evaluation measure, and an implicit centrality to 
identity and evaluation of identities measure both prior to and following the speech task 
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and support receipt manipulation. These pre and post measures and tasks are the same as 
those described in Study One. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Ninety Lehigh University undergraduate students participated as part of their 
research participation requirement for an introductory psychology course. Of the 90 
participants originally recruited for the study, 77 completed both parts of the study 
successfully. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 23 (M = 18.78) with approximately 60 
percent of the participants (N = 54) being female and approximately 40 participants being 
male (N = 23). The majority of participants identified themselves as being White (N = 
44) with 20 identifying as being Asian. Participants were compensated with 0.5 credits 
for each part of the two-part study completed to put towards their course research 
participation requirement.   
Measures 
 All of the measures used in Study Two are the same as those described and used 
in Study One.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: self-relevant 
support receipt, self-relevant no support, not self-relevant support receipt, or not self-
relevant no support. All participants completed the self-complexity measure online 




Part two of the study consisted of a 30-minute in lab session. The experimenter 
greeted participants upon entering the lab and presented them with the informed consent 
form. After signing the informed consent form participants were directed to a back room 
with a computer to complete the mood, self-evaluation, and implicit centrality to identity 
and evaluation of identities measures for the first time. The back room also had a video 
camera set up as to make the speech task scenario more believable. The mood and self-
evaluation measures were completed in the web survey program Qualtrics while the 
implicit measure was completed in DirectRT. After completing the pre-task measures, the 
experimenter introduced the speech task to participants, went over the general 
instructions, instructed the participant to read the directions carefully, set the timer for 
five minutes, and told the participant that she would be back when the timer went off. 
The experimenter then left the room so that the participant could complete the speech 
task.  
The speech task took the place of the task block used in Study One in order to 
create a difficult task whose self-relevance could be manipulated and for which practical 
support could be offered from an experimenter. Participants were first made aware that 
their participation would include writing and presenting a speech on a topic of personal 
importance while reading the informed consent form. In reality participants never had to 
write and present an actual speech, but they did complete a stressful task described as 
preparation for the writing and presenting of the speech. The instructions for the speech 
task were as follows: 
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“In the next part of the study, you will prepare and deliver a short speech, which 
will be video-recorded for later evaluation. The purpose of this speech is for you 
to describe, in a way that is persuasive and convincing, the importance and 
benefits of a particular social role or identity. The role or identity you will be 
asked to comment on may or may not be one of the ones that you listed in the 
previous survey that you completed about a week ago. The speech should be 
approximately 5 minutes in length.  
Specifically, we would like you to comment on the following role or identity: 
[insert self-relevant or not self-relevant self-aspect]. 
As preparation for your speech, we ask that you come up with FIFTEEN reasons, 
or pieces of evidence, why the assigned role or identity is important or beneficial 
to the individual possessing that identity, his or her family and friends, or society 
as a whole. This exercise will help you later in your speech writing so it is 
important you generate fifteen well thought-out and concrete examples. 
We will now give you 5 minutes to come up with fifteen reasons why the social 
identity or role below is important or beneficial. Please write them in the space 
provided below and on the back of this page. Please use the full 5 minutes. If you 
finish sooner, go back to your responses and try to make them even stronger. The 
experimenter will come to you when the time is up.” 
The decision to instruct participants to come up with 15 reasons or pieces of 
evidence why the given social role or identity is important or beneficial was informed 
using the results of the study by Schwarz and colleagues (1991) on ease of retrieval as 
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information. Schwarz and colleagues found that people pay attention to the subjective 
experience of ease or difficulty of recall in drawing inferences from recalled content. 
More specifically, the authors found that participants attributed themselves higher 
assertiveness after recalling six rather than 12 examples of assertive behavior and lower 
assertiveness after recalling six rather than 12 examples of unassertive behavior. Schwarz 
and colleagues concluded that it is difficult for participants to conclude that they are 
assertive (or unassertive) when it is so difficult to recall the requested number of 
examples. We asked participants to come up with 15 reasons why the given social role or 
identity is important to make the self-relevant task difficult enough to be stressful and not 
bolster their association with or positive association with that particular identity before 
receiving the support manipulation. Participants in the self-relevant domain condition 
completed the speech task for their first rank ordered identity. Participants in the not self-
relevant domain condition completed the speech task for an identity that was in the same 
basic group as their first identity, but not one provided by the participant nor a clear cut 
or stereotypical opposite of their self-aspect. These identities and the four “Me” and “Not 
Me” identities for the implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities measure 
were chosen in the same manner as described in Appendix A. 
The experimenter re-entered the room upon hearing the timer go off, marking the 
end of the speech task. Practical support was offered to participants in the support receipt 
condition by way of the experimenter offering a strategy suggestion upon re-entering the 
room. The strategy suggestion was as follows: 
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“Okay, your time for this part is up. I don’t know if this will be helpful, but a 
good way to come up with points for the speech is to think about what you would 
say if you were trying to convince a friend how important the social role or 
identity is.” 
 This support was intended to be non-evaluative in that the experimenter was 
instructed not to examine the participants’ responses to the speech task before offering 
the support to participants in this condition. The experimenter then informed all 
participants that they would be completing some of the same measures they had on the 
computer earlier before moving on to write and present the speech. After completing the 
mood, self-evaluation, and implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities 
measures again participants were informed through Qualtrics that they would not have to 
write and present the speech and that the experiment had reached its conclusion. Upon 
completing the post-task measures participants were debriefed and thanked.  
Results 
Analytic Approach 
Self-complexity, changes in the centrality of identities in representing the overall 
self from pre to post, and changes in the evaluation of identities from pre to post were 
calculated in the same way as described in the Analytic Approach section of Study One. 
The analyses of Study Two parallel those of Study One with support receipt replacing 
performance feedback. Similarly, we expected the same pattern of results for Study Two 
as we did for Study One, again with support receipt replacing performance feedback as a 
main effect and in the interactions. As in Study One, only the significant results from the 
 57 
 
analyses will be described in the Results section. Non-significant results of Study Two 
can be found in Appendix C. 
Results of analyses 
Descriptive analyses. The mean number of self-aspects reported by participants 
in Study Two (M = 6.71) was similar to that in Study One (M = 6.99) with a standard 
deviation of 2.38. Again, although participants were instructed to list at least four self-
aspects the minimum for the range of identities listed was three with the maximum being 
15, or the ceiling. Men (M = 6.06) and women (M = 7.15) reported a similar number of 
identities. Using the self-complexity calculation described in the Analytic Approach of 
Study One, participants of Study Two had a mean complexity score of 4.58 with a 
standard deviation of 1.94. The mean and standard deviation for this sample of 
participants is comparable to the data from the participants of Study One. The range of 
self-complexity scores for participants in Study Two was 1.62 to 13.61. Men (M= 4.24) 
and women (M = 4.82) had comparable self-complexity scores, although the ceiling for 
the range for women (13.61) was a bit higher than that for men (9.00) for men.   
  Changes in distress. We expected a three-way interaction between self-
complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt in predicting changes in distress such that 
failure feedback in a self-relevant domain would be more impactful for participants low 
vs. high in self-complexity.  Neither the main effects of self-complexity, self-relevance, 
and support receipt nor their interactions were predictive of change in distress from pre to 
post (Fs < 1.47, ps <.88). Figure 8 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 
SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
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Changes in self-evaluation. The expected pattern of results for change in self-
evaluation from pre to post paralleled those expected for change in distress: a significant 
three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt 
wherein participants low in self-complexity would be more impacted by support receipt 
in a self-relevant domain than would participants low in self-complexity. The results of 
the analyses indicate no main effect of self-complexity, self-relevance, or support receipt 
in predicting changes in self-evaluation (Fs < .79, ps < .377). Similarly, none of the two-
way interactions or the three-way interaction was significant (Fs < 1.24, ps < .270). 
Figure 9 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on 
self-complexity. 
 Changes in vigor. We also expected a three-way interaction between self-
complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt in predicting changes in vigor. However, 
we expected the pattern of results for the change in vigor to be opposite of that for the 
change in distress and self-evaluation – participants high in self-complexity would be less 
impacted by support receipt in a self-relevant domain than would participants high in 
self-complexity. Unlike in Study One, none of the main effects or interactions was 
significant in predicting changes in vigor across the study (Fs < 2.98, ps < .089). Figure 
10 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-
complexity. 
 Change in the centrality of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self. 
The change in the centrality of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self and the 
results that follow were measured using the implicit centrality to identity and evaluation 
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of identity task. As in Study One, no predictions were made for the results of the implicit 
measure. Self-complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt and their interactions were 
not predictive of the change in the centrality of the Me1 identity from pre to post (Fs < 
3.83, ps < .055). Figure 11 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and 
high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity. In the analysis performed to 
examine the change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity from pre to post, the main effect 
of self-complexity was significant such that participants low in self-complexity 
experienced a greater decrease in the evaluation of the Me1 identity from pre to post than 
did participants high in self-complexity (F (1,67) = 8.30, p = .0005). The two-way 
interaction between self-complexity and self-relevance was also significant (F (1,67) = 
5.20, p = .026). To better understand this two-way interaction we reran the analyses two 
times, once with self-complexity centered one standard deviation below its mean and 
once with self-complexity centered one standard deviation above its mean. The simple 
main effect of self-relevance was significant for participants low in self-complexity 
(F(1,67) =  ,p <.05) such that participants in the self-relevant domain condition decreased 
the evaluation of their Me1 identity to a greater degree than did participants in the not 
self-relevant domain condition. The simple main effect of self-relevance was not 
significant for participants high in self-complexity (F(1,67) = ,p =0.3641). None of the 
remaining results were significant (Fs < 1.51, ps < .223). Figure 12 shows the pattern of 
results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
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 Change in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined in 
representing the overall self. The change in centrality scores for identities Me2, Me3, 
and Me4 were averaged together instead of individually examining changes in the 
centrality of these three identities in representing the self to improve our power to detect 
a small effect. The results of the analysis indicate a significant main effect of support 
receipt (F (1,67) = 5.59, p =.021), such that participants who received support increased 
the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined greater than did participants 
who did not receive support. None of the remaining effects were significant (Fs <  .93, ps 
< .339).  Figure 13 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 
SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined. In 
the analysis examining predictors of the change in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and 
Me4 identities combined from pre to post, only the three-way interaction was significant 
(F (1,67) = 4.26, p = .043). To better understand this three-way interaction we first 
examined whether the simple two-way interaction between self-relevance and support 
receipt was significant for participants both low and high in self-complexity. The two-
way interaction between self-relevance and support receipt was marginally significant for 
participants high in self-complexity (F(1,67) = 3.54, p=0.064), but it was not significant 
for participants low in self-complexity (F(1,67) = 1.52, p = 0.222). To further probe this 
interaction, we examined the simple main effects of feedback for the self-relevant and not 
self-relevant domain condition for only participants high in self-complexity. The effect of 
feedback was significant in the not self-relevant domain condition for participants high in 
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self-complexity (F(1, 67)= 4.15, p=.046), such that participants had a greater decrease in 
the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined associated with failure 
feedback than with success feedback. The effect of feedback was not significant in the 
self-relevant domain condition for participants high in self-complexity (F(1,67) = 0.75, 
p=0.390). None of the main effects or two-way interactions was predictive of the change 
in the evaluation of these identities from pre to post (Fs < 1.39, ps < .243). Figure 14 
shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-
complexity. 
Discussion 
 Participants in Study Two, like participants in Study One, reported a range (3-21) 
and mean number of identities (M = 6.71) similar to the data from past studies of self-
complexity (e.g., Linville, 1980, 1987; Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008). These results 
suggest that the self-complexity measure developed for these two studies was able to 
elicit a similar range and number of responses from participants in reporting their self-
aspects.  
The prediction central to this thesis is that individuals low in self-complexity 
would react more negatively to support receipt in a self-relevant domain that would 
participants high in self-complexity. Negative reactivity to support receipt in a self-
relevant domain was examined both in terms of changes in distress and changes in self-
evaluation following the stressful speech task and support manipulation. The three-way 
interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt was not found to 
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be predictive of changes in distress and self-evaluation following the stressful speech task 
and support manipulation. 
As in Study One, another goal of this study was to examine the purported 
cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may results in affective consequences. 
In examining the results of the implicit task, there was a significant two-way interaction 
between self-complexity and self-relevance in predicting the change in the evaluation of 
the Me1 identity. Further exploration of this result revealed that the simple main effect of 
self-relevance was only significant for participants low as compared to high in self-
complexity. Participants low in self-complexity decreased the evaluation of their Me1 
identity in the self-relevant domain condition. This result reveals little about the cognitive 
mechanisms by which self-complexity may operate as there was no significant effect of 
support receipt. In looking at the change in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 
identities combined, there was a significant main effect of support receipt such that 
participants experienced a greater increase in the centrality of these identities following 
support than if they received no support. Without an interaction with self-relevance this 
result reveals little about the mechanism by which self-complexity may operate. Finally, 
there was a significant three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and 
support receipt in predicting the change in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 
identities. Further exploration of this interaction revealed that the two-way interaction 
between self-relevance and support receipt was only marginally significant for 
participants high in self-complexity. For participants high in self-complexity, the simple 
main effect of feedback was significant in the not self-relevant domain condition such 
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that participants experienced a decrease in evaluation associated with support receipt. 
Thus, while significant effects emerged in the analyses of the results of the implicit task, 
the pattern of results did not provide a meaningful explanation as to how self-complexity 
may operate.  
The purpose of Study Two was to examine whether self-complexity moderates 
reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant domains. Additionally, Study Two attempted 
to examine the cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may moderate affective 
reactions. Similar to Study One, although a few significant effects emerged through data 
analyses, the patterns were not in the predicted direction nor did they form a meaningful 
pattern.  
General Discussion 
 The central prediction of this thesis is that self-complexity, a moderator of the 
relationship between health and well-being, may account for some of the variability in 
reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant domains. While several studies support the 
ESI Model (Burke, Ignarri, & Goren, under revision) in that costs of support receipt are 
more likely to occur in self-relevant domains and that these costs are in part explained by 
decreased perceptions of self-efficacy, the relationship between support receipt in self-
relevant domains and its outcomes is not as clear cut. Burke and Perndorfer (in prep.) 
found that while, on average, participants reacted more negatively to support receipt in a 
self-relevant domain than to support receipt in domains for which personal efficacy and 
autonomy were less important, not all participants experienced costs following this 
support receipt. That is, while some participants experienced strong costs of support 
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receipt in a self-relevant domain, some were still able to experience strong benefits. This 
begs the question of what gives rise to this variability in support receipt in self-relevant 
domains. The ESI Model postulates that support receipt in self-relevant domains can be 
interpreted much like failure feedback, in that it can deliver the sense that one’s own 
efforts and abilities were insufficient. The design and hypotheses of this research flowed 
from the comparison between failure feedback and support receipt in self-relevant 
domains that both have the ability to delivery inefficacy cues to the recipient. We 
hypothesized that participants low in self-complexity would react more negatively to 
support receipt in self-relevant domains, much like they reacted more negatively to 
failure feedback in past studies of self-complexity as compared to participants high in 
self-complexity. 
The purpose of Study One was to replicate the results of past studies on self-
complexity, namely that participants low in self-complexity react more negatively to 
failure feedback than do participants high in self-complexity using novel measures, 
modified procedures, and incorporating a manipulation of self-relevance. Study One did 
not support the self-complexity affective extremity hypothesis (Linville, 1980). That is, 
participants low in self-complexity did not report more distress or lowered self-evaluation 
following failure feedback nor did they report more vigor or increased self-evaluation 
following success feedback than did participants high in self-complexity. The self-
relevance of the domain in which the stress and performance feedback occurred did not 
alter any of these relationships. Because the results of Study One, which aimed to test the 
validity of novel measures and a modified procedure within the self-complexity literature, 
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did not replicate the results of past studies of self-complexity, it hampered our ability to 
test the prediction that participants low in self-complexity would react more negatively to 
support receipt in self-relevant domains. The results of Study Two did not support our 
hypothesis that individuals low in self-complexity would react more negatively to support 
receipt in self-relevant domains than would participants high in self-complexity. That the 
results of Study Two do not support this hypothesis is not surprising given that the novel 
measures and modified procedures tested in Study One were unable to replicate the 
results of past studies of self-complexity before introducing the support manipulation. 
 Another goal of this thesis was to examine the purported cognitive mechanisms 
by which self-complexity may result in affective reactions. Linville (1980) argues that the 
perceived relatedness of different aspects, or the degree to which an experience that 
activates one aspect of the self also activates other aspects, will predict the degree of 
“spill-over” between different aspects. Roughly defined “spill-over” is the extent to 
which pleasant or unpleasant feelings about one part of the self result in pleasant or 
unpleasant feelings about other parts of the self-representation. The actual cognitive 
mechanism of this “spill-over,” however, remained both undefined and unmeasured in 
the self-complexity literature. We proposed three possible cognitive mechanisms that 
might explain how self-complexity moderates affective outcomes following failure or 
success feedback. First, positive or negative feelings about the focal identity may diffuse 
on to the feelings one has about other self-aspects, thereby affecting overall affect and 
self-appraisal. This cognitive mechanism most closely resembles the “spill-over” 
described by Linville (1980). Identities more closely related in terms of both actual and 
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perceived covariation are likely to be more affected in this spill-over process than are 
identities less interrelated with the focal identity. This cognitive mechanism went largely 
unexamined in this research. While we did measure changes in the evaluation of 
identities Me2, Me3, and Me4 combined following failure/success feedback or support 
receipt in self-relevant or not self-relevant domains we did not calculate interrelatedness 
scores for each of these identities and the focal identity to see if more interrelated 
identities were more affected than were others. We decided on this course due to the 
labor-intensive nature of computing these interrelatedness scores and the failure to 
replicate past research with the more conventional outcome variables. That there was no 
main effect of performance feedback or support receipt in a self-relevant domain on the 
change in the evaluation of both the focal and the non-focal identities, however, suggests 
that this “spill-over” was not demonstrated in these studies. 
 The second cognitive mechanism we examined as to why self-complexity may 
moderate affective reactions to negative stressful events is a reorganization of the 
structure of the self-representation. That is, participants may decrease the centrality of the 
focal identity and/or increase the centrality of other self-aspects in representing the 
overall self in response to failure feedback. We predicted that participants high in self-
complexity, due to the larger number of self-aspects held within their self-representation, 
would have more flexibility in this reorganization, which may in part explain why these 
individuals have been better able to escape the costs of failure feedback in past studies 
than were individuals low in self-complexity. The results of both Study One and Study 
Two, however, do not show evidence of this cognitive mechanism being at play. 
 67 
 
Participants did not decrease the centrality of the focal identity in response to failure 
feedback or support receipt in a self-relevant domain nor did they increase the centrality 
of the non-focal identities in representing the self. 
 The third and final cognitive mechanism examined in this research is that of a 
change in the evaluation of identities. We proposed that following failure feedback or 
support receipt in a self-relevant domain, participants may increase the positivity of the 
unaffected domains, thereby buffering the effect the negative event has on overall affect 
and self-evaluation. Again, participants high in self-complexity were believed to have 
more flexibility in this process in that they have more identities for which they can 
increase the positivity of, thereby reducing the effect of the negative event on overall 
affect and self-evaluation. The results of Study One and Study Two, however, do not 
suggest that participants changed the evaluation of the focal or three non-focal identities 
following failure/success feedback or support receipt in a self-relevant domain, no matter 
their level of self-complexity.  
Limitations  
The self-complexity measure and procedure for calculating participants’ self-
complexity were designed for these studies, but loosely based on the traditional card sort 
sorting task used to measure self-complexity (Dixon & Baumeister, 1991; Linville, 1980, 
1987; Luo & Watkins) and more recent forms of assessment (Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 
2008; Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & Revelle, 1999) described in the self-complexity literature. 
That participants in both Study One and Study Two listed numbers of identities both 
similar to past studies of self-complexity (e.g., Brook, Garcia, & Fleming, 2008; Linville, 
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1980, 1987) and similar to one another suggests that the pilot testing was effective in 
creating a self-complexity measure that elicited participants’ true number of self-aspects. 
Thus, a limitation in the study may lie in our novel procedure for calculating participants’ 
self-complexity scores. 
Many studies of self-complexity utilize Linville’s H statistic (Linville. 1980) in 
calculating self-complexity scores. Linville’s H statistic was defined as the minimum 
number of independent binary attributes needed to reproduce the trait sort used by 
Linville (1980. 1987) to measure self-complexity and claimed to assess both the number 
of self-aspects and their interrelatedness. More recently, however, evaluations of the H 
statistic have revealed this measure to be highly related to the number of aspects, but not 
indicative of the interrelatedness or overlap of self-aspects (Luo, Watkins, & Lam, 2008; 
Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & Revelle, 1999). This finding has left researchers of self-
complexity in search of a new way of calculating self-complexity that taps both the 
number of identities in the self-representation and their overlap. We believe that our 
procedure for calculating self-complexity scores takes into account both the number of 
self-aspects and their interrelatedness by examining the uniqueness of each identity as 
compared to others. The uniqueness of each identity was a measure of the uniqueness of 
the traits chosen to describe that identity. The procedure we devised for calculating self-
complexity resulted in a participant with more self-aspects and who used different traits 
to describe each self-aspect having a higher self-complexity score as compared to a 




Because the procedure we used for calculating self-complexity was novel to this 
research we also ran our analyses with a more crude measure of self-complexity: number 
of identities. Past studies of self-complexity have also examined the validity of using the 
number of identities as a crude measure of self-complexity (Linville. 1987).  While, the 
number of identities fails to adjust for the redundancy of traits chosen to describe those 
self-aspects, correlation analyses indicated that self-complexity scores and number of 
identities were highly correlated (r = .848, p < .05). Additional analyses were run that 
parallel those already reported. Analyses utilizing a simple count of the number of 
identities reported by each participant also did not reveal any significant effects in the 
predicted directions. Thus, it is unlikely that inability of Study One to replicate the results 
of past studies of self-complexity due entirely to our novel procedure for calculating 
participants’ self-complexity scores. 
Like our novel procedure for calculating self-complexity, we also developed a 
novel measure of self-complexity for this research. Our measure of self-complexity was 
more serial in nature in that participants had to first list all of their self-aspects before 
moving on to define their roles and identities in terms of traits as compared to the holistic 
nature of the card sorting task used in traditional studies of self-complexity. One possible 
flaw of our self-complexity measure is that participants did not have the option of 
returning to their list to add more self-aspects after moving on to the trait selection and 
importance to identity questions. This means that any additional self-aspects that came to 
mind during the course of the measure could not be recorded and thus not examined. 
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We do not believe, however, that our measure of self-complexity was less valid 
than forms of measurement used in past research on self-complexity. Two pieces of 
evidence exist to support our belief: our pilot testing and the data regarding the number of 
identities reported by participants in past studies of self-complexity. In fact, our original 
self-complexity measure was more holistic in that participants listed a self-aspect, chose 
traits for that self aspect, and rated its importance before moving on to define another 
self-aspect. We found, however, that this form of measurement resulted in participants 
reporting too few identities, or numbers not comparable to past studies of self-
complexity. Using our final measure of self-complexity, participants reported similar 
numbers of identities to those in past studies of self-complexity (Brook, Garcia, & 
Fleming, 2008; Linville, 1980, 1987). 
A possible limitation of our procedure is that we did not provide a cover story as 
to why participants were completing the same measures (mood, self-evaluation, implicit 
to centrality and evaluation of identities) both before and after a stress inducing task. 
Thus, the nature of our study in that it was measuring changes from pre task to post task 
may have been apparent to participants. Based on committee input, we decided that a 
cover story would be too convoluted and may arouse rather than quell suspicion in 
participants. Instead, we tried to incorporate implicit measures such as the implicit 
centrality to identity and evaluation of identities measures. We also used sliding visual 
analog scales as the response scales for the POMS as to detect subtle changes in mood. 
Additional limitations include that the task block was not plausible as being a 
measure of ability in a number of different domains. We first tried to combat this by 
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including an eclectic series of tasks, including tasks that resemble real psychological 
measures into the task block. Next, we tried to combat this by instead of framing the task 
block as being a measure of that participant’s focal identity and then providing traditional 
failure/success feedback on the tasks, we framed the task block as being a measure of 
ability in a number of different domains and told participants that their failure/success 
feedback was a percentile relative to individuals who indicated a certain self-aspect as 
being a part of their self-representation. Thus, their performance feedback provided either 
favorable or unfavorable social comparison information relative to a relevant reference 
group. Past studies of self-complexity have typically examined failure/success feedback 
in response to an achievement related domain or measure of intelligence. That we are 
interested in reactivity to support receipt for domains other than academic/achievement 
related domains to provide a better parallel to the study by Burke and Perndorfer (in prep) 
necessitated the creation of a stressful task to accommodate the diversity of self-aspects 
generated by participants. 
Similarly, one might argue that the stressful speech task and support manipulation 
did not successfully manipulate self-relevance. Past studies on the costs of support 
receipt, however, have used a similar speech task to create a self-relevant stress context 
(Bolger & Amarel, 2007). 
Implications and Future Directions 
 While the results of our analyses did not replicate the results of past studies of 
self-complexity nor demonstrate that self-complexity is a moderator of reactivity to 
support receipt in self-relevant domains, we do believe that our novel measure of self-
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complexity, modified procedure for calculating self-complexity scores, and novel 
measures of potential cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may operate are 
contributions to the self-complexity literature. Our measure of self-complexity elicited 
numbers of identities reported by participants similar to those of past studies of self-
complexity (e.g., Brook, Garcia, and Fleming, 2008; Linville, 1980, 1987). Our modified 
procedure for calculating self-complexity took into account both the number of identities 
in one’s self-representation and their uniqueness. Similarly, the self-complexity scores 
calculated using this procedure were positively and significantly correlated with a more 
crude measure of self-complexity – number of identities, which has been used in past 
studies of self-complexity and been shown to produce similar patterns in results as more 
complex forms of measurement.  
 While Linville (1980, 1987) often described “spill-over,” or the degree to which 
positive and negative feelings about one aspect of the self “spill-over” on to the 
evaluation of other self-aspects, thereby affecting overall affect and self-evaluation, the 
cognitive mechanism of this “spill-over” was never defined nor examined. We have 
added to the self-complexity literature by better defining this “spill-over” and providing 
two other cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may result in affective 
consequences. These mechanisms include the change in centrality of identities in 
representing the self and the change in the evaluation of identities. Additionally, we 
created a version of the IAT and modified scoring procedure, which allowed for an 
examination of these cognitive mechanisms. Future studies of self-complexity might 
utilize the same measures and procedures used in Study One, but restrict the stress 
 73 
 
context and performance feedback to achievement related domains, since past studies of 
self-complexity have largely examined the moderating effect of self-complexity in 
response to failure/success feedback for intelligence/academic achievement. 
 Future studies on support receipt in self-relevant domains might include measures 
of self-complexity as an individual difference variable. For example, administering and 
scoring the self-complexity measure used in this research to the sample of pregnant 
women in Burke and Perndorfer’s study (in prep.) may have accounted for some of the 
variability in reactivity to support receipt in the motherhood-related domain that was 
observed. Future studies examining the costs of support receipt would be advised to 
include a measure of self-complexity along with other potential moderators of failure 
feedback to explain any possible variability in reactivity to support receipt that may 
result.  
 In sum, the results of these studies did not replicate the results of past studies of 
self-complexity nor did they corroborate our hypothesis regarding self-complexity as 
being a moderator of reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant domains. More 
specifically, participants low in self-complexity did not react more negatively to failure 
feedback not support receipt in a self-relevant domain than did participants high in self-
complexity. We do not, however, believe that this research disproves the self-complexity 
affective extremity hypothesis nor discounts the possibility that self-complexity 
moderates reactivity to support receipt in self-relevant domains. Because no clear pattern 
of results emerged in either study, it is likely that other factors influencing the study were 
at play. This research adds to the literature on self-complexity in that we created a novel 
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measure for self-complexity, a modified procedure for calculating self-complexity scores, 
more clearly defined the cognitive mechanisms by which self-complexity may moderate 
affective reactions to stressful events, and finally devised a measure to examine these 
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Appendix A: Identity Organization and Selection for Studies One and Two 
 As previously mentioned, the data from the self-complexity measure were used 
to customize the part two materials for each participant. Specifically, the self-aspects 
listed by participants as being a part of their self-representation and the rank order of 
these identities was used to decide upon the framing of the task block and failure/success 
feedback and to create the implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities 
measure. How these identities were chosen for the framing of the task and to be included 
in the implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities measure will be explained 
below. 
The self-complexity measure data were downloaded in the interim 1-2 weeks 
between participants’ completion of the online self-complexity measure and laboratory 
session. A list of each participant’s self-aspects was made in the order of importance in 
representing the self (i.e., in the order given by participants in the rank order) with the 
first identity being the identity described as being the most important in representing the 
overall self. This identity was the identity used for the framing of the task and 
failure/success feedback for the participants in the self-relevant domain condition. The 
first identity listed in the rank order was not chosen for the framing of the task block and 
performance feedback only when that identity was a description of race or gender. We 
did not want participants to believe that their performance on the task block was being 
compared to all the members of their race or gender so we avoided these identities 
whenever possible. Four of the self-aspects provided by each participant were chosen to 
create the implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities measure. Thus, if 
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participants listed only four identities in the self-complexity measure, the minimum, then 
those four identities were chosen as the “Me,” or self-relevant identities for the implicit 
measure. If participants listed more than four self-aspects during the self-complexity 
measure then four identities were chosen across the rank order to represent the entire span 
of importance in representing the overall-self. For example, identities 1, 3, 5, and 7 of the 
rank order may have been chosen as the four “Me,” or self-relevant identities for the 
implicit centrality to identity and evaluation of identities measure for a participant who 
listed a total of eight identities in the self-complexity measure. This way, the “Me,” or 
self-relevant identities in the implicit measure represented a similar span of importance in 
representing the self for participants who provided only four identities as compared to 
those who provided 15. Again, we tried to avoid identities describing race or gender 
when choosing the four “Me” identities for the implicit measure as we believed that these 
identities may be more deep rooted and thus have a quality of being easier to categorize 
as being “Me” or “Not me” during the IAT. Furthermore, we believed that choosing the 
“Not me” identities for identities representing race and gender would be too stereotypical 
and thus salient during the implicit measure (e.g., “Man and woman” or “African-
American and White”).   
A composite list of all of the self-aspects provided by participants was compiled 
during the course of customizing the materials for part two of the study. The composite 
list was organized according to basic groups of identities (e.g., relational, 
employment/academics, ethnicity/patriotism, religion, hobbies, political views, social 
values, traits, miscellaneous). These basic identity groups were not predetermined, but 
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instead came naturally from the responses given by participants in the self-complexity 
measure. Examples of identities categorized as being relational include: sister, best 
friend, boyfriend, older brother, son, grandson, and nephew. Examples of identities 
categorized as being hobbies include: wrestler, musician, orch-dork, writer, and sorority 
member. The framing of the task block and failure/success feedback for participants in 
the not-self relevant domain condition and the four “Not me,” or not self-relevant 
identities, for the implicit measure for all participants were chosen from this composite 
list. More specifically, if a participant listed a relational identity as being the first identity 
in their rank order but was assigned to the not self-relevant domain condition, then 
another identity from the relational group, but not one provided by that particular 
participant was chosen for the framing of the task and performance feedback. The four 
“Not me” identities for the implicit centrality of identity and evaluation of identities 
measure were chosen in a similar manner. These “Not me” identities were chosen from 
the same basic groups of identities as the four “Me” identities provided by participants, 
but were identities that other participants had listed and were not similar to the identities 
provided by that particular participant, but were not clear cut or stereotypical opposites. 
For example, for a participant with the four “Me” identities “daughter, psychology major, 
reader, and theater technician,” the group of four “Not me” identities for the implicit 
measure could plausibly be “girlfriend, neuroscience major, pianist, and sorority 
member.” These “Not me” identities are from the same basic groups of identities 
(relational, employment/academic, and hobbies), but were not listed by the particular 
participant and are not clear cut or stereotypical opposites (such as choosing “athlete” as 
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the “Not me” for “reader”). In sum, for participants in the self-relevant domain condition 
the task block and performance feedback was framed in terms of the first identity 
provided in the rank order in the self-complexity measure. For participants in the not-self 
relevant domain condition, the framing of the task block and performance feedback was 
for an identity from the same basic group as the identity listed first in the rank order by 
that participant, but not one listed by that participant, and not a clear cut or stereotypical 
opposite. The four “Me” identities for the implicit measure were chosen to represent the 
span of importance in representing the overall self. The four “Not me” identities were 
chosen from the same basic identity groups as the four “Me” identities, but were again 
not identities listed by that particular participant and were not clear-cut or stereotypical 




Appendix B: Complete Results from Study One 
Change in distress. The results of the analyses indicate that there was no main 
effect of self-complexity (F(1,67) = 1.26, p = .266),  no main effect of self-relevance 
(F(1,67) = 0.03, p = .873), and no main effect of performance feedback (F(1,67) = 3.04, p 
= .086) in predicting change in distress. The two-way interactions between self-
complexity and self-relevance (F(1,67) = 0.38, p = .542), self-complexity and 
performance feedback (F(1,67) = 0.00, p = .957), and performance feedback and self-
relevance (F(1,67) = 0.66, p = .419) were also not significant. Finally, the three-way 
interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and performance feedback was not 
significant (F(1,67) = 0.33, p = .568). Figure 1 shows the pattern of results for individuals 
low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in self-evaluation. The results of the analyses indicate that there was no 
main effect of self-complexity (F(1,67) = 1.28, p = .263),  no main effect of self-
relevance (F(1,67) = 0.76, p = .388), and no main effect of performance feedback 
(F(1,67) = 1.33, p = .253) in predicting changes in self-evaluation. The two-way 
interactions between self-complexity and self-relevance (F(1,67) = 0.14, p = .705), self-
complexity and performance feedback (F(1,67) = 0.00, p = .980), and performance 
feedback and self-relevance (F(1,67) = 0.00, p = .963) were also not significant. Finally, 
the three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and performance 
feedback was not significant (F (1,67) = 0.04, p = .836). Figure 2 shows the pattern of 
results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
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Change in vigor. The main effects of self-complexity (F (1,67) = 0.34, p = .560), 
self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.10, p = .750), and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 0.26, p 
= .615) were not significant in the model. The two-way interactions between self-
complexity and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.56, p = .456) and that between self-relevance 
and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 1.21, p = .276) were not significant. The two-way 
interaction, however, between self-complexity and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 
11.24, p<.05) was significant. Similarly, the three-way interaction between self-
complexity, self-relevance, and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 19.81, p < .05) was 
significant in predicting changes in vigor across the study. Figure 3 shows the pattern of 
results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the centrality of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self. 
The main effects of self-complexity (F (1,67) = 0.01, p = .910), self-relevance (F (1,67) = 
0.22, p = .641), and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 0.29, p = .595) on change in the 
centrality of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self from pre to post were not 
significant. The two-way interactions between self-complexity and self-relevance (F 
(1,67) = 0.00, p = .967), self-complexity and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 2.67, p = 
.107), and self-relevance and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 0.69, p = .408) were not 
significant. Finally, the three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, 
and performance feedback was not predictive of the change in the centrality of the Me1 
identity from pre to post (F (1,67) = 0.23, p = .636). Figure 4 shows the pattern of results 
for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
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 Change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity. The main effects of self-
complexity (F (1,67) = 0.59, p = .445), self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.07, p = .791) and 
performance feedback (F (1,67) = 3.04, p = .086) on change in the evaluation of the Me1 
identity from pre to post were not significant. The two-way interactions between self-
complexity and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.76, p = .388), self-complexity and 
performance feedback (F (1,67) = 0.39, p = .537), and self-relevance and performance 
feedback (F (1,67) = 1.40, p = .242) were not significant. Finally, the three-way 
interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and performance feedback was not 
predictive of the change in evaluation of the Me1 identity from pre to post (F (1,67) = 
0.61, p = .437). Figure 5 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high 
(+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined in 
representing the overall self. The change in centrality scores for identities Me2, Me3, 
and Me4 were averaged together instead of individually examining changes in the 
centrality of these three identities in representing the self to improve our power to detect 
a small effect. The results of the analyses indicate that the main effects of self-complexity 
(F (1,67) = 0.10, p = .747), self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.20, p = .659), and performance 
feedback (F (1,67) = 3.48, p =.067) were not significant in predicting changes in the 
centrality of these three identities in representing the self from pre to post. The two-way 
interactions between self-complexity and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.08, p = .774), self-
complexity and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 0.15, p = .702), and self-relevance and 
performance feedback (F (1,67) = 0.12, p = .733) were not significant nor was the three-
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way interaction (F (1,67) = 2.02, p = .160). Figure 6 shows the pattern of results for 
individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the evaluation of the M2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined. 
Similarly, the change in the evaluation scores for identities Me2, Me3, and Me4 were 
averaged together instead of individually examining the changes in the evaluation of 
these non-focal identities. The results reveal that the main effects of self-complexity (F 
(1,67) = 0.13, p = .717) and self-relevance, [F(1,67) = 2.39, p = .137)] were not 
significant. The main effect of performance feedback was significant (F (1,67) = 5.04, p 
< .05). The two-way interactions between self-complexity and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 
1.98, p = .164), self-complexity and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 1.10, p = .298), 
and self-relevance and performance feedback (F (1,67) = 0.24, p = .627) were not 
significant. The three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and 
performance feedback (F (1,67) = 0.19, p = .663) was also not significant in predicting 
changes in the evaluation of identities Me2, Me3, and Me4 from pre to post. Figure 7 





Appendix C: Complete Results for Study Two 
Changes in distress. The results of the analyses indicate that there was no main 
effect of self-complexity (F (1,67) = 0.00, p = .998),  no main effect of self-relevance (F 
(1,67) = 1.47, p = .230), and no main effect of support receipt (F (1,67) = 0.14, p = .705) 
in predicting change in distress. The two-way interactions between self-complexity and 
self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.88, p = .351), self-complexity and support receipt (F (1,67) = 
0.03, p = .868), and support receipt and self-relevance (F (1,67) = , p = .998) were also 
not significant. Finally, the three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-
relevance, and support receipt was not significant (F (1,67) = 0.40, p = .531). Figure 8 
shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-
complexity. 
Changes in self-evaluation. The results of the analyses indicate that there was no 
main effect of self-complexity (F (1,67) = 0.30, p = .587),  no main effect of self-
relevance (F (1,67) = 0.79, p = .377), and no main effect of support receipt (F (1,67) = 
0.32, p = .571) in predicting changes in self-evaluation. The two-way interactions 
between self-complexity and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.06, p = .806), self-complexity 
and support receipt (F (1,67) = 1.24, p = .270), and support receipt and self-relevance (F 
(1,67) = 0.13, p = .724) were also not significant. Finally, the three-way interaction 
between self-complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt was not significant (F (1,67) 
= 0.08, p = .773). Figure 9 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and 
high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
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 Changes in vigor. The main effects of self-complexity (F (1,67) = 2.98, p = 
.089), self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.36, p = .551), and support receipt (F (1,67) = 1.46, p = 
.231) were not significant in the model. The two-way interactions between self-
complexity and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.67, p = .417), self-complexity and support 
receipt (F (1,67) = 0.39, p = .533), and that between self-relevance and support receipt (F 
(1,67) = 0.00, p = .969) nor was the three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-
relevance, and support receipt (F (1,67) = 0.53, p = .468) significant in predicting 
changes in vigor across the study. Figure 10 shows the pattern of results for individuals 
low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the centrality of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self. 
The main effects of self-complexity (F (1,67) = 2.16, p = .147), self-relevance (F (1,67) = 
3.83, p = .055), and support receipt (F (1,67) = 1.42, p = .238) on change in the centrality 
of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self from pre to post were not significant. 
The two-way interactions between self-complexity and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.42, p 
= .521), self-complexity and support receipt (F (1,67) = 0.00, p = .965), and self-
relevance and support receipt (F (1,67) = 0.33, p = .568) were not significant. Finally, the 
three-way interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt was 
not predictive of the change in the centrality of the Me1 identity from pre to post (F 
(1,67) = 0.09, p = .765). Figure 11 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 
SD) and high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity. The main effect of self-
complexity on the change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity from pre to post was 
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significant (F (1,67) = 8.30, p < .05). The main effects of self-relevance (F (1,67) = 1.51, 
p = .223) and support receipt (F(1,67) = 0.00, p = .959) on change in the evaluation of the 
Me1 identity from pre to post were not significant. The two-way interaction between self-
complexity and self-relevance in predicting the change in the evaluation of the Me1 
identity was significant (F (1,67) = 5.20, p < .05). The two-way interactions between self-
complexity and support receipt (F (1,67) = 1.19, p = .280), however, and self-relevance 
and support receipt (F (1,67) = 0.00, p = .977) were not significant. Finally, the three-way 
interaction between self-complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt was not 
predictive of the change in evaluation of the Me1 identity from pre to post (F (1,67) = 
0.53, p = .470). Figure 12 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and 
high (+1 SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined in 
representing the overall self. The change in centrality scores for identities Me2, Me3, 
and Me4 were averaged together instead of individually examining changes in the 
centrality of these three identities in representing the self to improve our power to detect 
a small effect. The results of the analyses indicate that the main effects of self-complexity 
(F (1,67) = 0.93, p = .339) and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 0.47, p = .498) were not 
significant in predicting changes in the centrality of these three identities in representing 
the self from pre to post. The main effect of support receipt was, however, significant in 
predicting changes in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities from pre to post 
(F (1,67) = 5.59, p <.05). The two-way interactions between self-complexity and self-
relevance (F (1,67) = 0.32, p = .571), self-complexity and support receipt (F (1,67) = 
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0.07, p = .788), and self-relevance and support receipt (F (1,67) = 0.27, p = .606) were all 
not significant. The three-way interaction was also not significant (F (1,67) = 0.08, p = 
.776). Figure 13 shows the pattern of results for individuals low (-1 SD) and high (+1 
SD) on self-complexity. 
 Change in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined. 
Similarly, the change in the evaluation scores for identities Me2, Me3, and Me4 were 
averaged together instead of individually examining the changes in the evaluation of 
these non-focal identities. The results of the analyses examining the effects of self-
complexity, self-relevance, and support receipt and their interactions on the change in the 
evaluation of identities Me2, Me3, and Me4 from pre to post reveals that the main effects 
of self-complexity (F (1,67) = 1.13, p = .293), self-relevance, (F (1,67) = 0.01, p = .942), 
and support receipt (F (1,67) = 0.52, p = .475) were not significant. The two-way 
interactions between self-complexity and self-relevance (F (1,67) = 1.39, p = .243), self-
complexity and support receipt (F (1,67) = 0.00, p = .960), and self-relevance and support 
receipt (F (1,67) = 0.32, p = .575). The three-way interaction between self-complexity, 
self-relevance, and support receipt (F (1,67) = 4.26, p < .05) was found to be significant 
in predicting changes in the evaluation of identities Me2, Me3, and Me4 from pre to post. 







Figure 1. Change in distress as a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity 
("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD 


























Figure 2. Change in self-esteem as a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and 
identity ("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high 





























Figure 3. Change in vigor as a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity 
("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD 



























Figure 4. Change in the centrality of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self as a 
function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity ("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) 
individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD from the mean) on self-






























Figure 5. Change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity as a function of feedback (failure 
vs. success) and identity ("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the 






















Figure 6. Change in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined in 
representing the overall self as a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity 
("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD 

























Figure 7. Change in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined as a 
function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity ("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) 
individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD from the mean) on self-































Figure 8. Change in distress as a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity 
("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD 

































Figure 9. Change in self-esteem as a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and 
identity ("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high 































Figure 10. Change in vigor as a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity 
("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD 

























Figure 11. Change in the centrality of the Me1 identity in representing the overall self as 
a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity ("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) 
individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD from the mean) on self-
























Figure 12. Change in the evaluation of the Me1 identity as a function of feedback (failure 
vs. success) and identity ("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the 
























Figure 13. Change in the centrality of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined in 
representing the overall self as a function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity 
("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD 































Figure 14. Change in the evaluation of the Me2, Me3, and Me4 identities combined as a 
function of feedback (failure vs. success) and identity ("Me" vs. "Not Me") for (i) 
individuals low (-1 SD from the mean) and (ii) high (+1 SD from the mean) on self-
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interested in examining why some individuals react more negatively to receiving help 
than do others. Specifically, my research examines self-complexity as a within-person 
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